

Is it in U.S. National Interests to Maintain Forward Deployed Military Forces in Asia?

A Monograph

by

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Fort Leavenworth, Kansas

Second Term AY 00-01

REPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGE

1. REPORT DATE (DD-MM-YYYY) 01-05-2001	2. REPORT TYPE monograph	3. DATES COVERED (FROM - TO) xx-01-2001 to xx-05-2001
4. TITLE AND SUBTITLE Is it in U.S. National Interests to Maintain Forward Deployed Military Forces in Asia? Unclassified	5a. CONTRACT NUMBER	
	5b. GRANT NUMBER	
	5c. PROGRAM ELEMENT NUMBER	
6. AUTHOR(S) Tate, Michael A. ;	5d. PROJECT NUMBER	
	5e. TASK NUMBER	
	5f. WORK UNIT NUMBER	
7. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME AND ADDRESS U.S. Army Command & General Staff College School of Advanced Military Studies 1 Reynolds Ave. Fort Leavenworth , KS 66027	8. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION REPORT NUMBER	
9. SPONSORING/MONITORING AGENCY NAME AND ADDRESS ,	10. SPONSOR/MONITOR'S ACRONYM(S)	
	11. SPONSOR/MONITOR'S REPORT NUMBER(S)	
12. DISTRIBUTION/AVAILABILITY STATEMENT A PUBLIC RELEASE		

13. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES

14. ABSTRACT

Before World War II, the U.S. had only negligible involvement in Asia. However, the defeat of the Japanese, the need to provide assistance to former European colonies and the perceived need to prevent the spread of Communism, left the U.S. as the major power in the region militarily, diplomatically and economically. As the fear of Communist expansion increased in the region, the U.S. extended its containment policy from Europe to Asia and signed a series of security alliances with Asian nations in the early 1950s to enhance regional security and prevent the rise of a unified, Communist Sino-Soviet monolith. This policy of containment with respect to China only began to change in 1969 as President Richard M. Nixon's Administration initiated a rapprochement. President James E. Carter's Administration completed the process in 1979 by recognizing Mainland China as the legal government of China to include Taiwan. Further requirements to contain the Soviet Union dissolved in 1991 with its internal collapse. With the end of the Soviet Union, the U.S. began reducing American forces in the region by roughly eleven percent from 1991 to 1995. The intent was to begin transferring security responsibilities to U.S. Allies in the region. Only President William J. Clinton's promise in 1995 to maintain 100,000 military personnel in Asia prevented a further reduction of forces. However, today the U.S. is again continuing to shift the responsibility for Asia's security to its regional Allies, an example being Australia. In July 2000, U.S. Secretary of Defense William Cohen called on Australia to take the lead in formulating policies regarding instability in the region. This is a result of the changing strategic balance following the collapse of the Soviet Union, the Asian economic crisis, and U.S. military constraints in manpower and budget. In light of a decade of change in Asia with the dissolution of the Soviet Union, military budget and manpower constraints, and the changing U.S. global priorities, the monograph examines whether it is in U.S. national interests to maintain forward deployed military forces in Asia. The monograph uses two criteria from the 1999 U.S. National Security Strategy (NSS) to answer the question: Protection of the physical territory of the U.S. and that of its Allies and friends, and continued stability in regions where the U.S. has a sizable economic stake. Although the NSS does not define protection of friends as a national interest, the author also examines the U.S. relationship with Taiwan. Taiwan is not a formal treaty Ally, but the U.S. has involved itself, directly or indirectly, with Taiwan's security since 1950. The monograph has five chapters. Chapter one provides the reader an historical examination of U.S. involvement in Asia and explains why the U.S. currently has forward deployed military forces in the region. Chapter two explores what U.S. territories are in the region and who are the U.S. Allies. Chapter three answers the question whether the U.S. requires forward deployed forces to protect its physical property and that of its Allies. Chapter four answers the question whether U.S. forward deployed forces are necessary in a region where the U.S. has a large economic stake. Chapter five summarizes the analysis and answers the monograph question: Is it in U.S. national interests to maintain forward deployed military forces in Asia? The chapter also provides recommendations on a new force structure for the region based on

the analysis.

15. SUBJECT TERMS

1999 U.S. National Security Strategy (NSS) ; Pacific Rim ; Korea ; Japan ; Taiwan

16. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF:			17. LIMITATION OF ABSTRACT Public Release	18. NUMBER OF PAGES 71	19a. NAME OF RESPONSIBLE PERSON Burgess, Ed burgesse@leavenworth.army.mil
a. REPORT Unclassified	b. ABSTRACT Unclassified	c. THIS PAGE Unclassified			19b. TELEPHONE NUMBER International Area Code Area Code Telephone Number 913 758-3171 DSN 585-3171

ABSTRACT

IS IT IN U.S. NATIONAL INTERESTS TO MAINTAIN FORWARD DEPLOYED MILITARY FORCES IN ASIA? by MAJOR Michael A. Tate, USA, 68 pages.

Before World War II, the U.S. had only negligible involvement in Asia. However, the defeat of the Japanese, the need to provide assistance to former European colonies and the perceived need to prevent the spread of Communism, left the U.S. as the major power in the region militarily, diplomatically and economically. As the fear of Communist expansion increased in the region, the U.S. extended its containment policy from Europe to Asia and signed a series of security alliances with Asian nations in the early 1950s to enhance regional security and prevent the rise of a unified, Communist Sino-Soviet monolith. This policy of containment with respect to China only began to change in 1969 as President Richard M. Nixon's Administration initiated a rapprochement. President James E. Carter's Administration completed the process in 1979 by recognizing Mainland China as the legal government of China to include Taiwan. Further requirements to contain the Soviet Union dissolved in 1991 with its internal collapse.

With the end of the Soviet Union, the U.S. began reducing American forces in the region by roughly eleven percent from 1991 to 1995. The intent was to begin transferring security responsibilities to U.S. Allies in the region. Only President William J. Clinton's promise in 1995 to maintain 100,000 military personnel in Asia prevented a further reduction of forces. However, today the U.S. is again continuing to shift the responsibility for Asia's security to its regional Allies, an example being Australia. In July 2000, U.S. Secretary of Defense William Cohen called on Australia to take the lead in formulating policies regarding instability...in the region. This is a result of the changing strategic balance following the collapse of the Soviet Union, the Asian economic crisis, and U.S. military constraints in manpower and budget. In light of a decade of change in Asia with the dissolution of the Soviet Union, military budget and manpower constraints, and the changing U.S. global priorities, the monograph examines whether it is in U.S. national interests to maintain forward deployed military forces in Asia.

The monograph uses two criteria from the 1999 U.S. National Security Strategy (NSS) to answer the question: Protection of the physical territory of the U.S. and that of its Allies and friends, and continued stability in regions where the U.S. has a sizable economic stake. Although the NSS does not define protection of friends as a national interest, the author also examines the U.S. relationship with Taiwan. Taiwan is not a formal treaty Ally, but the U.S. has involved itself, directly or indirectly, with Taiwan's security since 1950.

The monograph has five chapters. Chapter one provides the reader an historical examination of U.S. involvement in Asia and explains why the U.S. currently has forward deployed military forces in the region. Chapter two explores what U.S. territories are in the region and who are the U.S. Allies. Chapter three answers the question whether the U.S. requires forward deployed forces to protect its physical property and that of its Allies. Chapter four answers the question whether U.S. forward deployed forces are necessary in a region where the U.S. has a large economic stake. Chapter five summarizes the analysis and answers the monograph question: Is it in U.S. national interests to maintain forward deployed military forces in Asia? The chapter also provides recommendations on a new force structure for the region based on the analysis.

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INTRODUCTION

Before World War II, the U.S. had only negligible involvement in Asia.¹ Interests in Asia included trade and the security of its colony the Philippines. It was not until World War II that the U.S. became significantly involved in the region and began to perceive Asia as a vital national interest. The defeat of the Japanese, the need to provide assistance to former European colonies and perceived need to prevent the spread of Communism, left the U.S. as the major power in the region militarily, diplomatically and economically.²

The U.S. military became inextricably linked to Asia immediately after World War II. U.S. forces occupied Japan and assumed responsibility for areas that had been under Japanese control.³ The U.S. also supported the transition of former European colonies to self-government in Southeast Asia and attempted to reconcile the fragmentation of China's Civil War. The last task proved unsuccessful as the Chinese Communists under Mao Tse-tung assumed control of China in 1949. His success encouraged other revolutionary movements and Communist regimes in the region. In 1950, the U.S. committed troops under the auspices of the United Nations (U.N) to respond to North Korea's invasion; an invasion that most American leaders viewed as supported by the Soviet Union or by both the Soviet Union and China.⁴

As a result of the Communist pressures in the region and the fear of a unified, Communist Sino-Soviet monolith, the U.S. extended its containment policy from Europe to Asia. The U.S. signed a series of security treaties with Asian nations in the early 1950s to enhance regional security and prevent the rise of Sino-Soviet hegemony. This policy of containment with respect to China only began to change in 1969 as President Richard M. Nixon's Administration initiated a rapprochement. President James E. Carter's Administration completed the process in 1979 by recognizing Mainland China as the legal government of China to include Taiwan.⁵ Further requirements to contain the Soviet Union dissolved in 1991 with its internal collapse.

With the end of the Soviet Union, the U.S. began reducing American forces in the region by roughly eleven percent from 1991 to 1995. The intent was to begin transferring security responsibilities to U.S. Allies in the region. Only President William J. Clinton's promise in 1995 to maintain 100,000 military personnel in Asia prevented a further reduction of forces.⁶ However,

today the U.S. is again continuing to shift the responsibility for Asia's security to its regional Allies, an example being Australia. In July 2000, U.S. Secretary of Defense William Cohen "called on Australia to take the lead in formulating policies regarding instability...in the region."⁷ This is a result of many reasons: "the changing strategic balance following the collapse of the Soviet Union, the Asian economic crisis, and U.S. military constraints in manpower and budget."⁸ Moreover, in October 2000, Cohen ordered the Pentagon to begin an in-depth review of the American strategy to determine if it is possible to reduce or withdraw the stationing of ground forces in Japan and South Korea.⁹

In light of a decade of change in Asia with the dissolution of the Soviet Union, military budget and manpower constraints, and the changing U.S. global priorities, the monograph examines whether it is in U.S. national interests to continue to maintain forward deployed military forces in Asia.¹⁰ The monograph defines Asia as encompassing Northeast and Southeast Asia. As defined by the 1999 U.S. National Security Strategy (NSS), the 100,000 forward deployed forces are those military forces located primarily in Japan and South Korea; the number does not include those forces located in Alaska or Hawaii.¹¹

To determine if it is in U.S. national interests to maintain forward deployed troops in Asia, the monograph uses two criteria from the 1999 NSS: Protection of the physical territory of the U.S. and that of its Allies and friends, and continued stability in regions where the U.S. has a sizable economic stake. Although the NSS does not define protection of friends as a national interest, the author examines the U.S. relationship with Taiwan. Taiwan is not a formal treaty Ally, but the U.S. has involved itself with Taiwan's security since 1950.¹²

The monograph has five chapters. Chapter one provides the reader an historical examination of U.S. involvement in Asia and explains why the U.S. currently has forward deployed military forces in the region. Chapter two explores what U.S. physical property is in the region and who are the U.S. Allies. Chapter three answers the question whether the U.S. requires forward deployed forces to protect its physical property and that of its Allies. The chapter's first section explores external and internal threats. Section two analyzes Allied military capabilities, and the

final section is an analysis of the threat versus Allied military capabilities to determine if U.S. forward deployed forces are necessary for their defense.

Chapter four answers the question whether U.S. forward deployed forces are necessary in a region where the U.S. has a large economic stake. The chapter's first section examines U.S. economic stakes in Asia to determine if it is a key-trading region for the U.S. Next, the chapter explores the potential effects on stability in the region if the U.S. were to withdraw its forward deployed forces. The chapter concludes by analyzing sections one and two to determine if it is in U.S. national economic interests to maintain forward deployed forces in Asia

Chapter five summarizes the analysis and answers the monograph question: Is it in U.S. national interests to maintain forward deployed military forces in Asia? The chapter also provides recommendations on a force structure for the region based on the analysis.

CHAPTER ONE

This chapter is an historical examination of U.S. military presence in Asia. Its purpose is to provide the reader a basic comprehension of U.S. military involvement in Asia since 1835, and to explain why the U.S. currently has forward deployed military forces in the region.

HISTORY OF U.S. MILITARY PRESENCE IN ASIA

Before 1835, American incursions into Asia had been limited to merchant seamen visiting Chinese ports. However, in 1835, the U.S. stationed a naval fleet in Asia "for the protection of American military, political and economic interest."¹³ For the next sixty-two years, American military presence in Asia would be relatively minimal. In 1853, Admiral Perry introduced the Industrial Revolution to Japan, and American marines executed a series of missions in Japan, Korea, China, and Formosa to protect American lives.¹⁴ However, the sinking of the U.S.S. Maine in Havana harbor on 15 February 1898, and America's subsequent declaration of war against Spain on 25 April 1898, produced a fundamental change to the status quo.¹⁵

President William McKinley dispatched American naval forces to the Philippines to gain a rapid and decisive victory against the Spanish. His strategy proved successful as Spain quickly capitulated and agreed to a cease-fire. On 10 November 1898, Spain and the United States signed the Treaty of Paris, in which Spain ceded the Philippines to the U.S. for twenty million

dollars. On 21 December 1898, the U.S. proclaimed military control over the entire Philippine archipelago. The proclamation deepened the bitterness of Filipino revolutionary leaders intent on Philippine independence and who vehemently objected to the transfer of Philippine sovereignty from Spain to the U.S. On 4 February 1899, hostilities between American and Philippine insurgents commenced.¹⁶

“Hostilities continued until 1902 and cost the Americans more than 4,000 killed in action, nearly 3,000 wounded, and three times as much money as the war against Spain.”¹⁷ While U.S. military forces battled Filipino insurgents, President McKinley appointed William Howard Taft as the first civil governor of the Philippines in 1901 and in 1902, the U.S. Congress passed the Cooper Bill recognizing the Philippines as an unincorporated U.S. territory. U.S. military forces would continue as an occupation force until their withdrawal in 1907. However, U.S. control of the Philippines continued until Japan’s invasion in December 1941.¹⁸ As the Filipino insurrection continued, a Chinese uprising required President McKinley to dispatch additional military forces to China as part of a multinational force to quell the “Boxer Rebellion.”¹⁹

The Boxer Rebellion (1899-1900), was the result of a Chinese uprising by an obscure religious sect against China’s Ch’ing government, foreigners and representatives of foreign powers. The Boxers, who drew their members from the poor and dispossessed of eastern China, had suffered through a drought and near starvation. The Boxers believed this was the result of economic exploitation by the “foreign” Manchu dynasty and the various Western powers. In the early months of 1900, Boxers roamed the countryside attacking foreign missionaries and subsequently directed their efforts at the cities where foreign diplomats resided. To counter further attacks on their diplomats and families, the U.S., and seven other nations sent troops into China on a relief expedition.²⁰ President McKinley sent two thousand American forces and the multinational force quickly suppressed the uprising. By 1901, President McKinley had withdrawn all American forces save an army company for the Legation Guard. During the next thirty-six years, the U.S. would maintain forward deployed army and marine units in China, while the navy would conduct patrols on the Yangtze river to help protect American business interests, missionaries, and to help maintain stability in the country.²¹ However, Japan’s attack on China in 1937, compelled

President Franklin D. Roosevelt to start withdrawing all American military forces in the country. In November 1941, the last marine unit left China and transferred to the Philippines in time to defend the Philippine beaches against the impending Japanese invasion.²²

Japan's surprise attack on Pearl Harbor, 7 December 1941, brought an American military response of which, "The size and duration of troops deployments far exceeded those of 1898-1902. Until late 1943, official strategic priorities notwithstanding, more Americans fought in the Pacific than those in the Atlantic or Mediterranean."²³ The Roosevelt Administration wanted to ensure that Japan would never again become a threat to the U.S. or to the peace and security of the world. Therefore, President Roosevelt directed the Department of State to develop a plan that would encompass the complete disarmament and demilitarization of Japan. The Department of State concluded that implementing the plan would require the military occupation of Japan.²⁴

Initially, President Truman ordered the 6th and 8th U.S. Armies to occupy Japan. However, the American public's demand for demobilization and the rapid return of its service personnel compelled President Truman to withdraw the 6th U.S. Army, leaving only the 8th U.S. Army numbering under 200,000 personnel.²⁵

The occupation of Japan became significant to the U.S. in the battle against Communism. As the Soviet presence and influence expanded throughout Europe, Japan became the primary Asian base from which to try to limit the potential adversary's influence to the Sakhalin islands and Manchuria. In Japan, the U.S. acquired established air and naval bases at a nominal fee. Additionally, in 1947, the U.S. and the Philippines signed the military base agreement, which authorized the use of Clark Air Base, Subic Bay Naval Station and Cubic Point.²⁶ While the U.S. concentrated on containing the Soviet Union, there loomed another potential threat on the horizon: Mao Tse-tung's Chinese Communists.

In 1946, President Truman authorized the establishment of a military advisory group to advise Chiang Kai-shek's Nationalist Army in its civil war with Mao's Chinese Communist forces. President Truman also agreed to provide massive monetary support and surplus war materiel to the Nationalists.²⁷ Although U.S. military observers of the civil war did not fear Mao's Chinese Communist forces as an impending military threat to the U.S., they did fear a potential Sino-

Soviet Communist monolith in Asia. As Allies, they would possess a massive army, industrial strength and a common ideology. By 1949, Mao's Chinese Communist forces had soundly defeated Chiang's Nationalist Army, and on 1 February 1950, China and the Soviet Union signed the Treaty of Friendship, Alliance, and Mutual Assistance. The treaty left little doubt to the Truman Administration that the Chinese had become puppets of the Soviet Politburo and that the U.S. would have to contain the pair.²⁸ As the Truman Administration focused on preventing a Sino-Soviet Communist monolith, its attention turned to the future of the Korean Peninsula.

According to Don Oberdorfer, author of *The Two Koreas*, there was little consideration among U.S. Allies or by the Department of State for the postwar future of the Korean peninsula. On 10 August 1945, with Japan suing for peace and Soviet Union troops heading south down the peninsula, the Department of State hastily developed a plan that proposed that U.S. troops would occupy the area south of the thirty-eighth parallel, and the Soviet Union the area north of the parallel. The U.S. quickly incorporated the decision into General Order Number One for the occupation of Japanese-held territory. Several weeks later, the 7th Infantry Division arrived from Japan to perform occupation duty.²⁹

However, the Truman Administration had no desire to maintain an occupation force in Korea. In fact, in 1947, the Joint Chiefs of Staff sent Secretary of Defense James Forrestal a memorandum stating, "From the standpoint of military security, the United States has little strategic interest in maintaining the present troops and bases in Korea."³⁰ After a Joint Soviet-American Commission failed to reach an acceptable conclusion on Korean reunification, the Truman Administration offered the question of Korea's future to the U.N. The U.N. accepted the responsibility and established a mandate over the nation. After failing to reach a viable agreement with the Soviet Union on the fate of Korea, the U.N. proposed free elections in South Korea to establish a state.³¹ The U.S. recognized the Republic of Korea in 1949 and quickly withdrew nearly all 30,000 combat troops, leaving in country only five hundred American military advisors.³²

North Korea's invasion of South Korea on 25 June 1950, once again embroiled American military forces in Asia. The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff briefed President Truman that

Korea was a good place to draw the line against Communism. President Truman responded by ordering army, air force and naval units to Korea and informed the American public that, "The attack upon Korea makes it plain beyond all doubt that Communism has passed beyond the use of subversion to conquer independent nations and will not use armed invasion and war."³³ The U.S. and other nations would fight the North Koreans and Chinese another three years before the United Nations Command and North Korea signed the Armistice on 27 July 1953, establishing a cease-fire. American losses were "54,246 dead (33, 629 killed on the battlefield; 20, 617 military dead from other causes) and 103,284 wounded."³⁴ North Korea's Communist supported invasion and the 1950 Sino-Soviet treaty had convinced President Truman that containing the spread of Communism was paramount to U.S. interests. Similar logic would lead to the U.S. support of France in its desire to dominate Indochina.

Although the British and Dutch agreed to grant independence to the colonies in Asia, France, under Charles de Gaulle, envisioned recapturing its lost empire in Southeast Asia. The Truman Administration was at first hesitant to provide any support for the French, however, "After the 1950 Sino-Soviet Treaty, President Truman's Administration determined that Ho Chi Minh was a Soviet puppet and resisted the collapse of the French empire in Southeast Asia."³⁵ As a result, in 1950, the Truman Administration provided France ten million dollars to conduct its campaign against the Vietminh, because containing Communism was more important than anti-colonialism.³⁶

By 1953, the U.S. was supporting almost eighty percent of the French war effort and after the Vietminh defeated the French military forces at Dien Bien Phu on 7 May 1954, the resolution of the Vietnam situation evolved strictly as a U.S. problem. President Dwight D. Eisenhower subsequently ordered the deployment of U.S. military advisors into Vietnam and by the end of his term in 1961, there were approximately 1000 advisors in country. President John F. Kennedy committed additional military advisors and by 1963 had tripled the American advisory effort. President Lyndon B. Johnson continued the flow of advisors into Vietnam and by 1964, the number exceeded 23,000.³⁷ In 1965, President Johnson began deploying combat units into Vietnam until they reached a high of about 550,000 personnel.³⁸ However, that number was

shortly to change, because Richard M. Nixon's promise during the 1968 election campaign was to end the war and bring home American military personnel.

President Nixon announced in June 1969, his plan to immediately begin withdrawing troops from Vietnam. "In 1969, he ordered 65,000 troops home; in 1970, another 140,000; in 1971, another 160,000; and in 1972 a final 157,000, for a four year total of 552,000."³⁹ America's large-scale military involvement in Vietnam officially ended on 9 January 1973, as Dr. Henry Kissinger, President Nixon's assistant for national security affairs, concluded the final Paris peace talks agreement.⁴⁰ The last American forces officially left South Vietnam on 30 April 1975, after the North Vietnamese Army captured South Vietnam's capital Saigon. One could argue that U.S. involvement in Vietnam produced one of the most divisive periods in U.S. history. Vietnam engendered public dissention against overseas military commitments and the American public wanted President James E. Carter to resolve the problem.

"America's reaction against military commitments abroad in the wake of the Vietnam disaster found its voice in its first post-Vietnam president, Jimmy Carter."⁴¹ During his candidacy and as president, Jimmy Carter advocated withdrawing all military forces from South Korea. Although members of his administration believed the decision imprudent, President Carter issued the order to withdraw. However, new intelligence estimates showing a balance of military power favoring the North Koreans compelled President Carter to rescind his decision.⁴² In the end, there was only a reduction of 3,000 personnel, leaving a force structure of approximately 37,500 that remains today in South Korea. The level of forward deployed military forces would remain relatively stable until 1990, when President George H. Bush determined that conditions warranted another force reduction.

In 1990, President Bush approved a two-phased plan to further reduce American presence in the region. The plan called for reducing forces in Japan, Korea and Philippines approximately sixteen percent by 1995. President Bush based his decision on the abatement of the Soviet threat and budgetary pressures. However, when the Philippine Senate refused to renew the military base agreement for Clark Air Force Base and Subic Bay Naval Station, the planned force reduction reached approximately twenty-five percent or 33,000 personnel, leaving a forward

deployed force of approximately 102,000.⁴³ The relatively large reduction of American forces in the region concerned U.S. Allies that America would completely disengage from the region. As a result, in April 1997, the U.S. and Japan signed a joint resolution on security announcing that the U.S. would maintain a forward deployment capability of around 100,000 personnel in the region.⁴⁴

The U.S. currently has approximately 100,000 personnel in the region stationed primarily in Japan and South Korea. Major forces in Japan include the 3d Marine Expeditionary Force (MEF), 5th Air Force, 9th Theater Support Command and 12,000 afloat from the 7th Fleet; a total of 59,000 personnel. Forces in Korea include the 8th U.S. Army and the 7th Air force; a total of 37,500 personnel.⁴⁵ There are also approximately 3,800 seamen and airmen stationed in Guam.⁴⁶

In summary, U.S. military presence in Asia before 1898 was relatively minimal. The Spanish-American War and the subsequent Filipino insurrection rapidly altered the status quo. Occupation forces would remain in the Philippines until 1907 and after 1911, the U.S. maintained forces in China to protect business interests, missionaries and help maintain stability in the country. World War II brought a considerable American military response to the region and engendered a need to maintain a large forward deployed force to occupy Japan and provide deterrence against the spread of Communism throughout the region.

With the demise of the Soviet Union in the late 1980s, President George H. Bush determined the new security environment afforded the U.S. an opportunity to reduce its military presence in Asia.⁴⁷ President William J. Clinton's Administration completed the force reduction in 1995. By 1995, U.S. military forces in Asia had been reduced from 135,000 to approximately 102,000 military personnel. Today, the military maintains approximately 100,000 forward deployed forces in Korea, Japan, Guam and afloat.

This chapter has examined the history of U.S. military forces in Asia and has outlined why the U.S. currently maintains forward deployed forces in Asia. The next chapter explores U.S. sovereign territory in Asia and U.S. Allies in the region to help answer the first criterion: Does the U.S. require forward deployed military forces in Asia to protect its territory and that of its Allies.

CHAPTER TWO

The 1999 NSS defines the protection of U.S. property and that of its Allies as a vital national interest. This chapter defines what constitutes U.S. physical property in Asia and who are the U.S. Allies in the region. The NSS does not include the protection of friends as a vital national interest; however, the author examines the U.S. security relationship with Taiwan. The U.S. abrogated its formal security relationship with Taiwan in 1979, but the 1979 Taiwan Relations Act acknowledges that a Mainland China threat to the security of Taiwan would be of “grave concern” to the U.S.⁴⁸

The first section examines U.S. physical property in the region. The monograph defines physical property as a U.S. territory located in Asia with a military base.⁴⁹ Next, the monograph explores U.S. formal and informal (Taiwan) security alliances in Asia and the scope of U.S. security commitments. For the purpose of simplicity, when the monograph uses the term Allies, it includes Taiwan.

U.S. PHYSICAL PROPERTY

The U.S. has three territories in Asia: the Palau Islands, the Northern Mariana Islands and Guam, however, Guam is the only U.S. territory home to an American military base. Located at the southern tip of the Northern Mariana islands, Guam is the largest U.S. territory in Asia.

Guam is a U.S. territory with a locally elected government. In 1950, congress enacted the Guam Organic Act making Guam a U.S. territory and granting U.S. citizenship to the inhabitants, however, not the right to vote in U.S. elections.⁵⁰ The U.S. territory maintains a U.S. naval support base and Anderson Air Force Base. The island is home to approximately 3,800 naval and air force personnel.⁵¹ Next, the monograph explores U.S. security alliances in the region.

U.S. SECURITY ALLIANCES

The system of alliances is a relatively new phenomenon to the U.S. Before World War II, the U.S. adhered to a no alliance policy. A “no foreign entanglements” policy had been in effect since the adoption of the constitution. The catalyst for departure from the policy was the legacy of World War II and the Berlin blockade of 1948-1949.⁵² The Truman Administration concluded that to go forward with economic reconstruction and ensure political stability in Western Europe would

require a military alliance framework. It was clear to the U.S. that it would have to provide a security umbrella and pledged to help defend Western Europe against a Soviet attack. In 1949, twelve countries including the United States formed the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO).

By joining an alliance, the Truman Administration identified its post World War II security interests and signaled a commitment to intervene militarily if necessary to thwart Communist aggression. Before the Korean War, the only areas to merit military intervention were the NATO region, Latin America, and the defense perimeter running from Japan, through the Philippines, to Australia; a defense perimeter that did not include Taiwan or South Korea.⁵³

The U.S. had announced that it would protect a limited portion of the Pacific perimeter, but had no formal security alliances within Asia. Arguably, the U.S. omission of the Korean Peninsula as a security interest provided North Korea the opportunity to invade South Korea. To guard against further Communist aggression in Asia, the U.S. entered into security alliances with the Philippines, Japan, Australia and New Zealand in 1951, the Republic of Korea in 1953, Taiwan 1954, and signed the Southeast Asia Collective Defense Treaty (SEATO) in 1954.⁵⁴

Philippines

As the cold war intensified in 1947-1948, the U.S. extended its containment strategy from Europe into Asia. In 1947, the U.S. and the Philippines signed a military base agreement (MBA). The MBA provided for the retention of U.S. military bases and for the use of additional facilities in the future.⁵⁵ The two major facilities were Clark Air Base and Subic Bay Naval Base.

Four years after the MBA, the U.S. entered into its first Asian alliance with the Philippines on 31 August 1951. The 1951 Mutual Defense Treaty recognized that an armed attack in the Pacific area on either of the parties would be dangerous and that each would act in accordance with their respective constitutional process. The areas of interest in the Pacific included the metropolitan areas, the island territories under jurisdiction in the Pacific and the armed forces.⁵⁶ The U.S.-Philippine relationship remained strong until 1990 when the two countries reached an impasse over extending the MBA for an additional ten years.

In 1991, the Philippine Senate voted against ratifying the MBA. On 1 October 1992, the U.S. Navy withdrew the last of its forces from Subic Bay Naval Base. The eruption of Mount Pinatubo had destroyed Clark Air Base in June 1991, and by November of that year, the U.S. had transferred its control to the Philippine government.⁵⁷ In spite of the unilateral termination of the MBA, the U.S.-Philippine Mutual Defense Treaty remains in effect, and in 1999, the Philippine Senate approved a new visiting-forces agreement authorizing the U.S. to use Philippine ports and to participate in annual joint exercises.⁵⁸

Australia-New Zealand-U.S. (ANZUS)

On 1 September 1951, the U.S. entered into an alliance with Australia and New Zealand. The ANZUS Pact recognized that an armed attack in the Pacific area against any of the parties would endanger the peace and safety of the others. The treaty committed them to confer in the event of a threat, and in the event of attack to act in accordance with their respective constitutional process. The three nations also promised to develop an individual capacity to resist, as well as a collective capacity to act.⁵⁹ The ANZUS Pact did not provide for a formal military structure or standing forces. The tripartite relationship remained strong until 1985 when New Zealand instituted an antinuclear policy.

New Zealand's antinuclear policy banned nuclear-armed vessels from its ports, including those of the U.S. Navy. In response, the U.S. formally suspended its treaty obligation with New Zealand in 1986 and reduced the two countries' military ties.⁶⁰ Even with the rift between the U.S. and New Zealand, Australia considers the ANZUS Pact the cornerstone of its defense strategy.⁶¹

Japan

On 8 September 1951, the U.S. entered into a security alliance with Japan. The U.S.-Japan Security Treaty provided for Japanese security by agreeing that the two countries take joint action in the event of an armed attack. The treaty also eased regional concerns by providing for the continued stationing of U.S. forces in Japan, because much of Asia feared the reemergence of a powerful Japan.⁶² The U.S. now considers its alliance with Japan its most important bilateral relationship in Asia. Secretary of State Colin Powell said, "the alliance with Japan is the cornerstone of US-East Asia policy...."⁶³

The U.S. has approximately 47,000 forces deployed on Okinawa and Japan and 12,000 afloat. Stationed on Okinawa is a battalion of the 1st Special Forces Group, the 3d MEF, which includes the 3d Marine Corps Division along with the 1st Marine Corps Air Wing. On Japan, the 5th Air Force has two air wings, and the navy stations the 7th Fleet with one carrier battle group.⁶⁴

Republic of Korea

On 1 October 1953, the U.S. and the Republic of Korea signed a Mutual Defense Treaty. The treaty stipulates that each country recognizes that an armed attack in the Pacific Area on either of the parties would be dangerous and that each would act in accordance with their respective constitutional process. As a precautionary measure, when the U.S. Senate ratified the treaty, they added the provision that the U.S. would not honor the treaty if South Korea acted as the aggressor. The treaty also authorized the stationing of U.S. air, land and sea forces in South Korea.⁶⁵

Currently the U.S. maintains approximately 37,500 personnel stationed in the Republic of Korea. The 8th U.S. Army and the 7th Air Force comprise the preponderance of the forces. The U.S. and the Republic of Korea engage in annual joint exercises “Fool Eagle” and “Ulchi Focus Lens.”

Taiwan

Mainland China’s incessant threats towards Taiwan compelled President Dwight D. Eisenhower to bring Taiwan into a formal collective security system. The two countries signed a Mutual Defense Treaty in 1954 and formally tied the U.S. into Taiwan’s security regime.⁶⁶ However, President Carter’s decision to formally recognize the People’s Republic of China (PRC) in 1979, completing the rapprochement process began in the Nixon Administration fundamentally altered the status quo.

On 15 December 1978, President Carter announced to the world that the PRC and the U.S. would establish diplomatic relations on 1 January 1979. Furthermore, the U.S. formally ended the 1954 U.S.-Taiwan Mutual Defense Treaty on 1 January 1980.⁶⁷ Congress believed the president’s plan to be inadequate because it failed to provide for Taiwan’s security and it did not address a commitment from the PRC to refrain from using force against Taiwan.⁶⁸ As a result,

Congress enacted Public Law 96-8: Taiwan Relations Act (TRA). Unlike the 1954 Mutual Defense Treaty, the TRA did not commit the U.S. to the defense of Taiwan, but did authorize the sale of weapons to Taiwan for its defense, and authorized the president and congress to determine appropriate action if the security of Taiwan is in question.⁶⁹

Southeast Asia Collective Defense Treaty

In 1954, Secretary of State John Foster Dulles called for an alliance to prevent Communist countries from gaining control of Indochina.⁷⁰ On 8 September 1954, representatives of eight countries signed the Southeast Asia Collective Defense Treaty (Manila Pact), commonly referred to as the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO). The countries included: Australia, France, New Zealand, the Philippines, Pakistan, Thailand, the United Kingdom and the United States. Although the Indochina countries of Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia did not sign the treaty, the treaty accorded them military protection.⁷¹

The treaty defined its purpose as defensive only and included provisions for mutual aid to prevent and counter subversive activities. SEATO had no standing forces, but relied on its member states to provide forces when necessary. Animosity rose between the member nations because of a perceived dominance in SEATO by the western nations, specifically the U.S. In 1968, Pakistan withdrew from SEATO and in 1976, France suspended financial support. The SEATO formally ended on 30 June 1977.⁷² Despite the dissolution of SEATO, the Manila Pact remains viable and is the basis of U.S. security commitments to Thailand.

In summary, President Truman established security alliances in the early 1950s to guard against further Communist aggression in Asia. With the exception of the SEATO and the 1954 Mutual Defense Treaty with Taiwan, the U.S. has maintained all the formal security relationships. Even with the dissolution of SEATO, Thailand remained an Ally as part of the Manila Pact. With respect to Taiwan, the TRA authorizes the U.S. to sell Taiwan equipment, and for the U.S. government to determine appropriate action if Mainland China attempts to forcibly reunify with Taiwan. The monograph has now identified U.S. physical property with a military base, and Allies in the region. The next chapter examines possible threats to the U.S. interests, explores Allied

capabilities, and determines if U.S. forward deployed military forces are necessary to protect U.S. physical property and that of its Allies.

CHAPTER THREE

After World War II, the U.S. determined there was a clear and present danger to its interests from the Soviet Union seeking to expand its Communist ideology into Asia, and was willing to use force if necessary to achieve its goal. China's 1949 transition to a Communist State and North Korea's subsequent invasion of South Korea in 1950, exacerbated U.S. concerns that all the three nations were a threat to its interests in the region.⁷³

To combat the perceived threats, the U.S. maintained forward deployed troops in Asia to deter, and if necessary, militarily engage the countries. To strengthen the U.S. position, it entered into bilateral security alliances with the Philippines, Australia/New Zealand, Japan, South Korea, Taiwan, and the multilateral SEATO. SEATO formally ended in 1997; however, Thailand remains a U.S. Ally as part of the Manila Pact. The U.S. abrogated its security arrangement with Taiwan in 1980, but the T RA now governs the U.S. security commitment to Taiwan. Because the 1999 NSS states that a vital interest is to protect U.S. physical property and that of its Allies against threats, this chapter examines if there is still a threat or potential threat to the U.S. vital interests in the region.

The chapter's first section examines the threat from the former Soviet Union, now the Russian Federation, China, and North Korea. Next, the section examines if new or potential external threats have emerged that may compel the U.S. to intervene. Finally, the section explores if any U.S. Allies have internal threats, i.e., insurgencies, which have the potential to destabilize or overthrow the current regime. The chapter's second section explores friendly military capabilities. The chapter's final section analyzes the threat versus Allied military capability to determine whether the U.S. requires forward deployed forces in Asia to protect its physical property and that of its Allies.

The analysis examines near and mid-term threats. The monograph defines near-term to 2005, and mid-term from 2006 to 2010. The monograph does not attempt to prognosticate beyond 2010 because with the dynamic world in which we live, it is virtually impossible to forecast that far in the future. The monograph does not explore the threat from nuclear weapons, nor does it address the internal problems in Indonesia, because unlike Taiwan, the U.S. has never had a formal security alliance with the country. The first threat examined is that from the Russian Federation.

THREATS TO U.S. PHYSICAL PROPERTY AND THAT OF ITS ALLIES

RUSSIAN FEDERATION

“After the December 1991 dissolution of the Soviet Union, the Russian Federation became its largest successor state, inheriting its permanent seat on the United Nations Security Council....”⁷⁴ In 1993, Russia promulgated a new military doctrine, which renounced its global ambitions and focused instead on developing a force capable of reacting to regional disputes. The new doctrine advocated a smaller, lighter, and more mobile military force led by an officer corps with a higher degree of professionalism.⁷⁵ Because of political and economic problems, the doctrinal transition has proven unsuccessful. Russia still maintains a large active duty force of approximately 1.5 million active duty personnel and a reserve force of 2.4 million. However, *Jane’s Sentinel Security Assessment* argues that the criminalization and demoralization of the armed forces have made the services operationally ineffective.⁷⁶

The decline in capabilities does not appear to be reversible in the near to mid-term. Currently all the services suffer from poor training, a lack of fuel and spare parts for equipment, and a declining defense expenditure. Since 1996, the actual defense expenditures declined from \$10.1 billion to \$5.5 billion in 1999. The 2001 defense budget called for defense to receive \$7.4 billion, however; as much as seventy percent of the budget supports Russia’s long range nuclear weapons.⁷⁷ The declining defense budgets and internal problems have caused Russia to be very cautious in external affairs.

An example is Russia’s conciliatory attitude towards Japan on the issue of the Kuril islands. Russia and Japan both claim ownership of four islands lying approximately twelve miles from

Japan's most northern island of Hokkaido. Soviet troops seized the islands at the end of World War II and the question of ownership is the only obstacle to preventing a treaty to formally end wartime hostilities between the two countries. In 1998, the two countries agreed to a joint responsibility for the islands with the eventual transfer of the islands back to Japan. Although Russia has not yet formally agreed to the transfer, the two countries continue to engage in discussions and an agreement is likely in the near future.⁷⁸ Another example of Russia's cautious approach to external affairs is its decision not to support North Korea in a conflict with the South Korea

In 1995, Russia notified North Korea that it would not longer recognize the Treaty on Friendship, Cooperation, and Mutual Assistance signed in 1961. The two countries signed a new treaty in February 2000; however, the provision promising Russian military assistance to the North Korea in time of war was deleted.⁷⁹ Russia's policies are unlikely to change in the near to mid-term because the military is and likely remain incapable of conventional decisive action outside the Russian Federation.

The author uses two criteria to make this assessment: equipment procurement and research and development. *Jane's Sentinel Security Assessment* argues that equipment procurement since 1991 has fallen sixty-five percent. Procurement is likely to remain at the current level to enable factories to remain open. The Russian research and development industries are developing new and modernized weapons systems, but they are for export to countries that can pay for them. The Russian government has promised orders for new equipment to its military, however, is not able financially to follow through and commit.⁸⁰

In summary, although Russia still maintains a large military force, it is only useful for defensive operations and incapable in the near to mid-term of imposing its will using its armed forces on U.S. physical property or U.S. Allies in the region. Because of the state of its military, Russia has developed a cautious approach to dealing with external issues and is using diplomacy instead of the threat of force to achieve its foreign policy goals. The monograph next examines China's threat to Taiwan and its desire to control of disputed Spratly islands in the South China Sea and the Senkaku islands in the East China Sea.

CHINA

*If a grave turn of events occurs leading to the separation of Taiwan from China in any name, or if Taiwan is invaded and occupied by foreign countries, or if the Taiwan authorities refuse, sine die, the peaceful settlement of cross-Straits reunification through negotiations, then the Chinese government will have no choice but to adopt all drastic measures possible, including the use of force, to safeguard China's sovereignty and territorial integrity, and achieve the great cause of reunification.*⁸¹

China's National Defense White Paper 2000

In China's White Paper on the "One China Principle and Taiwan Issue," Beijing stated that the settlement of Taiwan is an internal matter and although a peaceful reunification is preferable, China will not renounce the use of force.⁸² If China does decide to use force against Taiwan, it must employ the world's largest military consisting of the People's Liberation Army (PLA), the People's Liberation Army Navy (PLAN), and the People's Liberation Army Air Force (PLAAF).⁸³

China has a standing active duty military of 2.5 million of which 1.8 million are in the PLA. The PLA's ground forces are comprised of approximately seventy-five maneuver divisions. However, in 1999, Prime Minister Jiang Zemin announced that PLA would reduce its size over the next three years by 500,000. The intent is to transform the PLA to fight local wars under high tech conditions by focusing on quality, not quantity.⁸⁴

Much attention in the West has focused on the recent reorganization of the Chinese Army. The PLA has organized 12 "rapid reaction" divisions that can mobilize quickly to respond to external as well as internal threats. However, China has yet to build enough air transportation to make the army a large external intervention force. The PLAAF now has the capability to drop two airborne brigades, approximately 6000 soldiers on Taiwan, which is possibly enough to control major ports and wait for reinforcements.⁸⁵ Additionally, the PLAN is incapable of moving a substantial force across the Taiwan Strait.

China's ability to conduct an amphibious assault on Taiwan using ground forces is virtually impossible because of the lack of amphibious assault ships. Currently China only has forty-nine troop carrying ships with three more under construction; enough to carry one mechanized division across the strait. It would take approximately 600 landing craft nearly two weeks to transport

twenty divisions to Taiwan. Moreover, there is no sign that China plans to build more ships in the future.⁸⁶ Therefore, any attack on Taiwan would have to involve the PLAAF.

China is now developing and procuring aircraft and airborne systems with capabilities relevant to military operations with Taiwan. Analysts expect operational deployment of China's most advanced aircraft between 2005-2010. These aircraft have advanced air-to-air missiles, which counter the increasingly sophisticated Taiwanese Air Force. The PLAAF has increased its capability with the purchase of Russian jet fighter and fighter-bombers, but a Rand study concludes, "the PLAAF's capabilities relative to most of its potential rivals will diminish over the next 10 years."⁸⁷ Moreover, authors Andrew J. Nathan and Robert S. Ross, *The Great Wall and the Empty Fortress*, assert that the even with purchases from Russia, the PLAAF is incapable of defending its own ground and naval forces from a superior air force.⁸⁸ Finally, Frank W. Moore, a research analyst for the Institute of Defense and Disarmament Studies, argues "that the size of China's armed forces will continue a recent pattern of decline, and to drop quite steeply in some cases, such as combat aircraft."⁸⁹ However, Moore does believe China may see improvement in its surface ships.

China is expanding its naval power by purchasing capital ships and submarines from Russia. The most recent additions to China's navy are two Russian built "Sovremenny" class destroyers. Delivered in February 2000, they are the most powerful warships ever operated by the PLAN. Moreover, the Chinese have recently purchased four Kilo class submarines from Russia and may purchase more in the future.⁹⁰ Although, China is modernizing its land, air and sea forces, its greatest near-term threat to Taiwan is its missiles.

The PLA is working to improve the accuracy and range of its land-based missiles. By 2005, the PLA expects to deploy two types of short-range ballistic missiles and a first generation land-attack cruise missile. The missiles would have the ability to accurately target critical facilities, such as airfields, C4I nodes and key logistics centers on Taiwan.⁹¹ These missiles will be in addition to the already 400 short, medium and long-range missiles capable of reaching Taiwan. Department of Defense analysts believe that by 2005 the Chinese will have approximately 650 missiles capable of targeting Taiwan.⁹² Taiwan now considers a missile attack to be the most

seriously threat from China.⁹³ In addition to developing weapons to threaten Taiwan, China desires to have a “blue water” navy to exercise control over the Spratly islands in the South China Sea.

Seven countries claim a portion or all of the islands located in the South China Sea: China, Taiwan, Vietnam, the Philippines, Indonesia, Malaysia, and Brunei. The foundation for their claim to ownership is not the international law of the sea, (the law of the sea does not adjudicate issues over land areas) but on history.⁹⁴ Mainland China has openly declared that the islands and reefs are Chinese territory. China’s yearning for the Spratlys is a result of an increased need for oil and fish. In 1989, China’s Nanhai Oceanography Research Institute reported that the continental shelves around the Spratlys might contain up to 105 billion barrels of oil reserves, twenty-five billion cubic meters of gas reserves and 370 tons of phosphorous.⁹⁵

Petroleum is a primary concern to U.S. Allies in region. The Spratlys sit astride sea routes through which twenty-five percent of the world’s shipping passes and straddle the sea lanes between the Straits of Malacca and Japan, the route traveled by ships bearing some ninety percent of the oil Japan and South Korea consumes.⁹⁶ Additionally, the Philippines face a serious problem of energy supply and must import an estimated ninety-five percent of its oil. It hopes in the future to tap into 100 million barrels of oil from around the Spratlys and become one of Southeast Asia’s leading oil producers. In 1992, a senior Philippine officer stated that if there were resources around the Spratlys, the Philippines would have to defend them.⁹⁷

Although U.S Allies, specifically the Philippines, Japan, and South Korea have interests in the Spratlys, the U.S. has established a position that any conflicting claims to the Spratlys should be settled peacefully and without threats or force. The U.S. does not support any position on the merits of the claims, but has offered to help mediate the problem.⁹⁸ Another area of contention concerning a U.S. Ally and China is the Senkaku islands.

In 1895, Japan claimed the Senkaku Islands, and until the late 1970s when reports indicated that oil and natural gas reserves might exist near the islands, China had not questioned Japan as the rightful owner. However, since then, China has claimed sovereignty over the islands and the two countries have had minor disputes. China however, remains prudent not to overreact

because it relies heavily on Japanese aid, loans, and investments.⁹⁹ China must also remain prudent because it lacks a power projection navy to enforce any demands on the Spratly or Senkaku islands. Ultimately, China wants to influence the region as far out as the U.S. territory of Guam, but must significantly increase the tempo of the navy's modernization plans if it hopes to become a navy power.

Although China is modernizing its navy, it is doing so at a very moderate pace and without significantly increasing the numbers of ships. The recent doubling of the PLAN's Marine Corps still means a relatively small amphibiously trained force of about 12,000 troops. The PLAN wants to be capable of prevailing in disputes over property rights in the region, but does not appear to be developing a navy capable of doing so.¹⁰⁰

"Most analysts agree that, while the Chinese military is currently weak, it intends to be relatively stronger 10 to 20 years from now, with the capacity to stand up to the United States in a conflict situation."¹⁰¹ However, that depends on a great degree on China's economic development and its ability to either develop organically or purchase modern weapon systems. It appears that in the near to mid-term, China's greatest and only serious threat to a U.S. physical property or to an "Ally", remains Taiwan.¹⁰²

In summary, China is endeavoring to transition the world's largest active duty military to a smaller, high-tech, modern military capable of influencing the region's policies and combating the U.S. in any dispute.¹⁰³ According to analysts, China is developing an air force and missiles capable of inflicting damage on Taiwan between 2005-2010.¹⁰⁴ However, the PLAN lacks the capability in the near to mid-term to conduct amphibious operations onto Taiwan, to be able to influence territorial disputes in the Spratly/Senkaku islands, or to influence Guam. China's only threat in the region in the near to mid-term is towards Taiwan using aircraft and missiles. The monograph next examines one of the world's most militarized nations: The Democratic People's Republic of Korea.

DEMOCRATIC PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF KOREA (DPRK)

*"The principal threat in Korea today is one of conventional attack posed by massive Northern ground and air forces largely concentrated along the intra-Korean border."*¹⁰⁵

Edward B. Atkinson

Kongdan Oh and Ralph C. Hassig, *North Korea Through the Looking Glass*, claim the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) may attack into the Republic of Korea (ROK) for three reasons: A perceived North Korean imbalance of military strength in its favor, a preemptive strike by foreign governments on North Korean targets, or if the economic and social conditions deteriorate to a level, where the integrity of the state was in danger.¹⁰⁶ If the DPRK attacked, it would attempt to emulate the German "blitzkrieg" doctrine in World War II, by commencing with a barrage of artillery and perhaps chemical weapons against Seoul to engender confusion and panic among the fourteen million inhabitants. Subsequently, ground forces supported by the air component would rapidly maneuver through three avenues of approach to capture Seoul, continue to sweep south before major forces from the U.S. could reinforce.¹⁰⁷ The blitzkrieg strategy requires to DPRK to be one of the most militarized nations in the world.

Jane's Sentinel Security Assessment estimates that North Korea has 1,082,000 active duty forces and approximately 4,700,000 reserve forces. Of North Korea's estimated 23,702,000 (1999) inhabitants, four of every one hundred serve in the military.¹⁰⁸ With the fifth largest active duty military in the world, President Kim President Kim Jung Il must devote a large percentage of the country's gross domestic product (GDP) for defense. In 1999, the military received twenty-five to thirty percent, or \$1.3 billion of the country's GDP.¹⁰⁹ The North Korean armed forces comprise the army, air force and navy, with the army representing approximately eighty-eight percent of the total force structure.

The North Korean People's Army (KPA) has an estimated 950,000 active duty soldiers.¹¹⁰ The KPA organizes the forces into nineteen corps with the majority located in attack positions within forty miles of the DMZ.¹¹¹ However, analysts cannot simply measure the threat based on the number of personnel or weapons systems. Much of the KPA equipment is obsolete and a

perennial shortage of fuel and repair parts required a thirty percent reduction in training during 1998-1999.¹¹² The army is one element of the blitzkrieg strategy; but the army must have air support for a major ground offensive into the ROK.

The DPRK Air Force has a large quantitative advantage in combat aircraft over the ROK. As part of the DPRK blitzkrieg strategy, the air force provides close air support to a rapidly maneuvering army while also attempting to gain air superiority between the DMZ and Seoul.¹¹³ However, many of the aircraft are obsolete and pilot training is rare because of shortages of fuel and spare parts. Moreover, an estimated the sixty percent of the aircraft lack modern radar and navigation systems making them vulnerable in poor weather conditions.¹¹⁴ The last element of the DPRK armed forces to analyze is the navy.

The North Korean Navy is the smallest element of the armed forces numbering approximately 45,000 sailors. The design of the navy limits it to brown water operations. Most are small boats of two hundred tons or less. Of these, ninety-percent are coastal patrol boats and landing craft intended for infiltration operations and coastal defense. North Korea does possess some twenty outdated Romeo-class submarines that are antiquated and slow, but still able to block the sea lines of communication.¹¹⁵

It appears that in the near-term the DPRK continues to be a threat to the ROK, however, mid-term ambitions are virtually impossible to predict. Winston Churchill, in a 1939 radio address declared that, "I cannot forecast to the action of Russia. It is a riddle wrapped in a mystery inside an enigma."¹¹⁶ Churchill could be describing North Korea in 2001.

In summary, the DPRK may threaten the survival of the ROK. The DPRK maintains a large military force, specifically 950,000 ground forces. However, quantity does not represent its true capability. The armed forces, specifically, the army and air force suffer significantly from obsolete equipment, fuel and spare part shortages, and reduced training opportunities. The monograph has examined threats that have existed since the mid 1940s and early 1950s. Next, the monograph explores the development of a relatively new threat to a U.S. Ally: Myanmar.

MYANMAR (BURMA)

Myanmar, formally named Burma until 1989, borders China, India, Laos, Bangladesh, and Thailand. In 1987, a military junta gained control of the government and remains in power giving Myanmar one of the world's harshest military dictatorships.¹¹⁷ The repressive military dictatorship is the primary reason for the tension between Myanmar and Thailand. As part of the concerted plan to maintain power, the government actively pursues anti-government rebels and refuses to allow them a sanctuary in Thailand. In February 2001 during a spring offensive against the Shan rebels, the two countries clashed on the border leaving nineteen dead. The newly elected Thailand Prime Minister, Thaksin Shinawatra, quickly responded to the incident by declaring that if the border problem can not be resolved diplomatically between the two countries, "We will have to deal with it in our own way, and this is an assertive policy."¹¹⁸

Diplomatic resolution may prove difficult because of the 19 February 2001 death of Lt. Gen. Tin Oo, the number four man in the Myanmar government hierarchy. STRATFOR argues that because of an internal struggle for Lt. Gen Tin Oo's position, the Myanmar government's focus is not on the resolving the border dispute. This failure to address the border dispute could exacerbate tensions and potentially lead to a larger conflict involving the two neighbors. If that transpires, Myanmar has a large military to engage Thailand.¹¹⁹

Myanmar maintains a military of approximately 450,000 personnel, with the army contributing 400,000. *Jane's Sentinel Security Assessment* argues that Myanmar's military continues to grow and is one of the few countries in the region that is increasing versus reducing the size of its military. Myanmar's primary source of military equipment is China; China provides new, but not state of the art equipment for the Myanmar armed forces.¹²⁰

In the near-term, there is a potential for hostilities between the two countries as Thailand's new Prime Minister maintains a hard-line stance against Myanmar's border violations. Mid-term predictions are virtually impossible. The variables include the continued status of the Myanmar's current regime and its desire to resolve the border dispute diplomatically versus military conflict.

In summary, Myanmar and Thailand are currently involved in small border clashes, however, there is potential for the clashes to escalate into a larger conflict. If diplomatic efforts fail, and the

conflict escalates, Myanmar is capable of responding with 400,000-person army equipped with new equipment from China. The monograph has analyzed the current and potential external threats to U.S. physical property and that of its Allies in Asia. Next, the monograph examines the one U.S. Ally whose internal problems are its greatest threat.

PHILIPPINE'S INTERNAL THREAT

"The Philippines face three major internal threats: terrorist organizations from the remnants of the old Communist Party of the Philippines (CCP), organized and unorganized criminal activity, and the Muslim separatists movement in Mindanao and the smaller islands to the southwest."¹²¹ The greatest threat to internal stability arises from the Muslim secessionist movement.

The Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF) is the principal guerilla organization demanding Islamic rule on Mindanao and other southern islands. The organization's estimated strength is 10,000. The Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) is the largest anti-government movement with an estimated strength of 15,000, although it claims 120,000 supporters. STRATFOR considers the MILF more dangerous than the MNLF because of its uncompromising demand on Islam. Two smaller groups, the Abu Sayyaf and the Moro Islamic Reform Group, also contribute an estimated 1,700-5,000 guerillas to the Islamic cause.¹²² The combined secessionist forces number approximately 30,000, however; because they are separate organizations with competing agendas, they do not present the threat of an organized, coordinated force. In addition to the four secessionist organizations, a secondary concern for the Philippine government is the vestiges of the CCP.

In 1999, after the Philippine government agreed to resume peacetime military engagement with the U.S. the CCP announced the resumption of anti-government terrorist operations and have now joined the MILF in sabotage and terrorist operations in Mindanao.¹²³ The success of the secessionist movements in the past few years caused, Teodoro Beningo, once a spokesman for former President Corazon Aquino, to declare, "The nation is not only in distress, it is sinking."¹²⁴

In summary, the greatest threat to the Philippines is instability caused by an Islamic secessionist movement in Mindanao and the southern islands of the Philippine archipelago. In

1999, the CCP aligned with the MILF to conduct operations in the south exacerbating the problem of secessionist movements for the Philippine government.

To summarize the section, of the three primary post World War II threats to U.S. interests in Asia, the former Soviet Union, China, and North Korea, only two remain. The Russian Federation's military is in a chaotic state and is not purchasing new equipment or investing in research and development. Although China is working to modernize its military, it is not developing the power projection navy to influence territorial disagreements in the region. However, analysts claim by 2005, it may be capable of inflicting severe damage on Taiwan using its air force and land-based missiles. North Korea remains a threat to South Korea, because of its large army and Seoul's proximity to the DMZ. However, a shortage of fuel, spare parts and training opportunities plague the military. Myanmar, a relatively new threat, refuses to provide a sanctuary in Thailand to the anti-government rebels, causing the two countries to engage in border conflicts. Myanmar has a large and expanding military with new equipment provided by China. Finally, the Philippines face no external threat, but does face a growing internal threat from the Islamic secessionist movement, which is contributing to the country's instability.

The monograph has determined that China and North Korea present a serious military threat to U.S. Allies. There is also potential for the Myanmar/Thailand border clashes to expand into a larger conventional conflict, and the Islamic secessionist movements in the Philippines may present a threat to the stability of the Philippine government. The next section examines the military capabilities of Taiwan and South Korea to defend themselves, in what would be large scale conflicts. The section also explores Thailand's military capability to defend itself in a smaller scale conflict. Finally, the monograph examines the Philippine military capability to thwart a possible destabilizing Islamic secessionist movement in the southern islands of the archipelago.

ALLY MILITARY CAPABILITY

After conducting a threat analysis in the previous section, the monograph determined that there is not a threat against U.S. physical property in the near to mid-term; however, there does exist potential threats, both external and internal to U.S. Allies. The monograph now explores the military capabilities of U.S. Allies and future modernization plans. The following section then

compares threat versus friendly capabilities to determine if the forward deployed forces are necessary to protect U.S. Allies.

TAIWAN

*Our primary task is the establishment of a preventive, speedy response military capability, to let Mainland China know of the terrible sacrifice that an invasion of Taiwan could entail, so that they might not take actions.*¹²⁵

Lee Teng-hui, President.

After the termination of martial law in 1987, the Taiwan officially recognized the People's Republic of China (PRC) as the legal government of Mainland China and abandoned the ambition of reunifying China by force. Taiwan's military strategy has since shifted from a focus of attacking the mainland to a defensive and deterrence strategy. The shift from an offensive to a defensive and deterrence strategy called for balancing the development of its three armed forces, with the navy and air force having first priority.¹²⁶

Jane's Sentinel Security Assessment calls the Taiwan Air Force (TAF) one of the country's strongest military assets. During peacetime, the TAF's mission is to protect the security of Taiwan's air space as well as the integrity and sovereignty of Taiwan areas. Because of the PLAAF's numerical superiority in aircraft, the TAF has focused on upgrading its air fleet in order to conduct its assigned wartime mission.¹²⁷

The TAF has approximately 520 combat aircraft. Of these 520, 150 are F-16 Fighting Falcons purchased from the U.S. and 60 Mirage 2000-5s purchased from France. Taiwan is seeking to improve its air force by purchasing some of the most advanced weapons technology from the U.S. for the F-16. Since June 2000, the U.S. has agreed to sell Taiwan over \$550 million worth of equipment to enhance the survivability of its F-16s, and in September 2000, the U.S. also announced it would equip the F-16s with an advanced medium range air-to-air missile.¹²⁸ The remaining inventory includes approximately 180 of the older F-5E/Fighters and 130 of the Indigenous Defense Fighters (IDF). In 2000, President Chen announced that Taiwan is planning to develop aircraft that can strike targets on Mainland China if Beijing launches an invasion.¹²⁹

Taiwan has made the development of its air force priority, however, not at the expense of developing a capable navy to counter any Mainland China blockade.

In the mid and late 1990s, Taiwan began purchasing foreign ships and producing their own systems. The navy has taken delivery of six Lafayette-class frigates from France equipped with Phalanx air-defense systems, surface-to-air missiles, anti-ship missiles and anti-submarine warfare helicopters. Furthermore, the navy leased nine Knox-class frigates from the U.S. with the options to lease additional ships. The frigates possess the MK 15 Phalanx 20-millimeter gun and the AN/SWG-1A Harpoon anti-ship missile launcher. The sonar on the frigate also provides Taiwan's Navy with its most effective anti-submarine capability.¹³⁰ One of the most profound problems for Taiwan's Navy is the lack of submarines. The navy only possesses four World War II era submarines, while the PLAN has approximately seventy submarines. The U.S. refuses to sell Taiwan any additional submarines because it fears Taiwan may use them as an offensive capability to attack Mainland China.¹³¹ In addition to purchasing naval assets, Taiwan is also in the process of building its own indigenous naval force aimed at keeping open the sea lanes surrounding Taiwan, enhancing counter-blockade capabilities and in general, neutralizing the PLAN's efforts to control the sea.

Taiwan is embarking on an aggressive program to develop an indigenous naval capability. In the 1990s, Taiwan produced seven Perry-class frigates with the help of technology from the U.S. The frigates primary function is for anti-submarine warfare. Furthermore, Taiwan has begun producing coastal patrol boats to build up their intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance capability.¹³² Taiwan also desires to purchase four Arleigh Burke-Class Guided Missile Destroyers (AEGIS) from the U.S. to provide it the capability to intercept China's land-based and aircraft mounted missiles.¹³³ President Clinton's Administration refused to consider selling the AEGIS to Taiwan; however, Taiwan is readdressing the issue with President George W. Bush's Administration. Probably the greatest emphasis now is on anti-missile defense. In addition to the AEGIS, Taiwan is now actively pursuing the acquisition of systems that could contribute to an eventual missile defense system.¹³⁴

In summary, Taiwan is has a strong air force capability and is developing combat aircraft to strike Mainland China if necessary. Taiwan also has a capable surface navy, but lacks submarines. Taiwan's most significant weakness is its anti-missile defense systems to counter the growing Chinese threat. It is seeking four AEGIS equipped destroyers from the U.S., and has recently decided to acquire the systems necessary to build a viable missile defense system, however, completion date is unknown. Next, the monograph examines the military capability of the Republic of Korea.

REPUBLIC OF KOREA (ROK)

The *Asian Defense Yearbook 1999-2000*, states the ROK government has charged its military with four missions. Maintain a firm military posture to counter the North's threats; develop internal and external military relations to establish bilateral or multilateral strategic cooperative relations; develop a force to contend with 21st century scenarios to include the reunification of the peninsula; and to create a positive image of the armed forces.¹³⁵

The first priority is to have a military capable of defending against the North Korea threat.¹³⁶ As a result, the military continues to modernize its equipment, training, and doctrine to build an elite, smaller, self-reliant force. According to *Jane's Sentinel Security Assessment*, the ROK plans to reduce by the end of 2001, the overall active duty military strength from 672,000 to 400,000.¹³⁷ The modernization focuses on all three components of its military, but the air force and navy are receiving the emphasis because of the requirement to contend with the post-reunification security environment. Although the modernization focuses primarily on the air force and navy, the army remains the primary deterrent to an invasion.

According to the *South Korea Defense White Paper 1999*, the ROK Army (ROKA), is the core of the national defense against a North Korean invasion. The ROKA has an active duty strength of 562,000 soldiers divided into three field armies with the preponderance of the forces aligned parallel to the DMZ. The army's modernization plan includes improving maneuverability and firepower by transitioning from older armor vehicles to modern ones. Of the 2,130 main battle tanks, the army now has approximately 1,000 newer KA1 series, which has the same 120mm smooth bore gun system installed on the U.S. M1A1 and M1A2 Abram's main battle tank.¹³⁸ The

army is also replacing the old M113 armored personnel carrier with a new infantry-fighting vehicle, and developing domestically the M109A2 self-propelled howitzer.¹³⁹ A surprising resource contributing to modernization is the Russian Federation. To compensate the ROK for its \$1.8 billion outstanding loan, the ROK has agreed to accept newer military systems, i.e., T-80 main battle tank, as a method of repayment. The ROK's primary deterrence capability is the army, however, the air component is also critical to the nation's defense.

Jane's Sentinel Security Assessment calls the ROK Air Force (ROKAF) well trained and a significant contributor to the country's deterrence strategy. The ROKAF is currently upgrading its eight fighter squadrons by purchasing additional 120 F16-C/D models with air-to-air missile capability, and flying at low altitude in darkness while avoiding enemy radar. Interestingly, the primary determinant on aircraft acquisition is not North Korea's Air Force, but to match the capability and power of Japan's Air Force.¹⁴⁰ The ROKAF is also trying to reduce its dependence on U.S. capabilities. In 2000, the ROKAF purchased eight reconnaissance and surveillance aircraft from the U.S., reducing the dependence on U.S. assets by forty percent.¹⁴¹ While the ROKAF acquires systems designed to engage Japan, the ROK Navy (ROKN) is attempting to develop a "blue water" navy early this century capable of protecting its maritime assets far beyond the Korean peninsula.

Like the ROKAF, the ROKN appears to be focusing on post-reunification in pursuing a power projection capability and devoting its resources to advanced warships and submarine assets. At the core of the modernization program is the development of advanced warships to improve on an increasingly sophisticated surface fleet. The ROKN has also decided to increase its quantity of its submarine fleet by contracting for an undisclosed number of submarines for delivery early this century.¹⁴²

In summary, the ROK military's primary mission is to deter and if necessary defend against a North Korean invasion. The ROK has a powerful, well-trained military that is continuously endeavoring to improve the quality of its defense posture. The military continues to modernize its three branches, while seeking to build an elite, smaller, self-reliant force by reducing the active duty strength and assuming duties previously executed by the U.S.

THAILAND

Thailand's success against Communist insurgencies in the late 1960s has allowed its armed forces to develop a conventional force designed to retard foreign intervention forces versus counterinsurgency. Thailand's vibrant economy during the early to mid 1990s provided Thailand's armed forces an opportunity to purchase new equipment and build a capable conventional force; however, the 1997 Asian financial crisis severely damaged the military's modernization program forcing it to upgrade existing equipment versus purchasing new.¹⁴³

Although modernization has slowed, Thailand still possesses a formidable military force. Thailand has an active duty armed force numbering 273,000 with Royal Thai Army (RTA) contributing 196,000; the Royal Thai Navy (RTN) 40,000, including 20,000 marines; and the Royal Thai Air Force (RTAF) 43,000. Thailand also possesses a relatively large reserves force numbering 500,000.¹⁴⁴

Jane's Sentinel Security Assessment calls the RTA a well-trained and efficient force. The RTA's combat forces include eleven divisions, eight separate battalions, one air cavalry brigade and one artillery brigade. Much of the equipment is relatively old, and the economic crisis has precluded the army from upgrading its current inventory. The army is not the only service to suffer the economic crisis; the RTAF is also unable to modernize.¹⁴⁵

Jane's Sentinel Security Assessment considers the RTAF capable because most pilots have received their training in the U.S. Air Force.¹⁴⁶ The RTAF has 305 aircraft, but only has the budget to operate thirty-five of the sixteen year old F-5E/F's and thirty-six F-16A/Bs as frontline fighters.¹⁴⁷ "To adjust to new threats in the balance of airpower in the region the RTAF has drafted a plan to downsize its personnel while increasing its capacity to fulfill a variety of other missions."¹⁴⁸ The Thai government is willing to reduce the size of the air force, because the focus in defense planning is to expand and modernizing the RTN to protect its maritime interest. The Thai government based its decision on the perceived increase in the naval capabilities of India and China, "increasing Chinese commercial and military activity in Myanmar, and the increasing flow of illegal firearms from Cambodia to Myanmar and Bangladesh via the Andaman Sea."¹⁴⁹

Although funding constraints have slowed modernization, the Thai armed forces remain combat ready. The Thai armed forces continue to engage in military exercises with its Allies to include the U.S. and Australia. Moreover, in 2000, the U.S. provided a ninety million dollar package of ammunition for the Thai armed forces to conduct training and increased funding for International Military Education and Training (IMET) to assist the armed forces during the economic crisis.¹⁵⁰

In summary, although the 1997 Asian economic crisis has adversely affected Thailand's goal to modernize its armed forces, Thailand still maintains a formidable military force. Thailand has been able to mitigate the affects of the economic crisis by engaging in combined training exercises and through receipt of funding from the U.S. for training and IMET. The monograph has examined the military capabilities of the Taiwan, the ROK and Thailand. Next, the monograph analyzes the Philippines' military capability to handle the country's internal threat and a growing Philippine perception of external threats.

PHILIPPINES

The primary role of the Philippine military is to defend the country against internal threats operating in the North and South. The long-range plan is to transition the responsibilities for controlling the internal threat to the 45,000 member Philippine National Police, while the armed forces modernize and focus on potential external threats against Philippine sovereignty. However, that goal requires an extensive modernization of weapons, logistics and maintenance systems, and a dramatic improvement in the morale and discipline of the military.¹⁵¹ In the interim, the armed forces continue to focus on the internal threat.

The Philippine active duty military numbers approximately 116,500. The army contributes 68,000; air force 15,500; and the navy 23,000. The Philippine Army possesses no significant firepower to deter an external threat; however, it does have nearly 400 armored personnel carriers/infantry fighting vehicles, and 230 light artillery pieces to use against the secessionists. When the army conducts counterinsurgency operations, it must plan for limited air support. The Philippine Air Force (PAF) has 15,500 personnel, but suffers from a lack of funding, which contributes to severe maintenance problems and a shortage of support facilities. At the end of

1999, the PAF had only 57 of 206 fixed-wing aircraft operational and only 83 of 149 rotary-wing aircraft operational. While the PAF is in extremely poor shape, according to *Jane's Sentinel Security Assessment*, the Philippine Navy (PN) appears in "grave need of upgrading and modernization."¹⁵²

The PN comprises 13,500 sailors, a 7,500 Marine Corps, and a 2000-man Coast Guard. The PN has only eleven older ships; therefore, the Ministry of Defense has made the navy a priority to receive the largest allocation of modernization funds, followed by the air force and army.¹⁵³

In summary, the armed forces primary mission is counterinsurgency. The military is in poor condition, but does possess a relatively large force to combat anti-government forces. The military eventually hopes to transition to a conventional force focusing on external threats; however, it is unlikely in the near to mid-term that the Philippines armed forces can make the transition.

To summarize the section, Taiwan has built a formidable air force by purchasing aircraft from the U.S. and France. Taiwan is currently developing an indigenous fighter capable of striking Mainland China. Taiwan also is modernizing its navy and possesses a capable surface fleet, but still lacks ships designed to intercept Mainland China's land-based missiles. The ROK has a powerful, well trained military that has adopted an aggressive modernization program designed to improve its defense posture and replace the dependency on U.S. intelligence and warnings capabilities. It appears that the ROK does not anticipate an attack from the North, or is quite confident in its ability to successfully repel an invasion, because the modernization focus is engaging Japan in the future.

Thailand's military has suffered from the Asian economic crisis, but has remained a formidable force by engaging in combined training exercises and through receiving additional funding from the U.S. to mitigate the Asian economic crisis. The Philippines' armed forces primary mission is to combat internal security problems. The state of the military is poor, but the government is working to improve the defense posture and transition the armed forces from a counterinsurgency force to a conventional one capable of defending the sovereignty of the Philippines against potential external threats.

The next section analyzes threat capabilities versus Allied capabilities to determine if U.S. forward deployed forces are necessary to help defend Taiwan, the ROK, Thailand and the Philippines.

ANALYSIS OF THREAT/ALLY MILITARY CAPABILITIES

This section analyzes threat and friendly military capabilities to determine if forward deployed forces are necessary to defend U.S. Allies. The section also provides recommendation on which, if any U.S. forces should remain in the theater to help defend its vital interests.

CHINA-TAIWAN

China maintains an enormous quantitative advantage, 4.8:1, in active duty army personnel; however, the Mainland's inability to project the forces onto Taiwan counteracts the numerical advantage. The PLAN has only enough amphibious troop carrying ships to move simultaneously one mechanized division across the almost 100 miles of open water. Additionally, the PLAAF possesses only enough troop transport capability to drop approximately two brigades, 6000 soldiers, onto Taiwan. Even if China attempted to control key infrastructure nodes with the 6000 soldiers, Taiwan has designed twelve strike brigades that have the mobility and firepower to counter any airborne operation.¹⁵⁴ The Mainland also maintains an approximately 6:1 advantage in combat aircraft; however, the PLAAF has only 1300 aircraft positioned within a 300-mile radius of Taiwan.¹⁵⁵

In the case of the PLAAF, quantity does not equate to air superiority. *Jane's Sentinel Security Assessment* argues that although the PLAAF has quantitative superiority, the TAF has qualitative superiority. In fact, a Rand study expects a PLAAF reduction of capabilities in the near to mid-term relative to potential rivals. The problem for the PLAAF is that many of its aircraft are so old that the retirement of weapons systems will exceed the rate of acquisitions.¹⁵⁶ The PLAAF only has fifty modern SU-27s purchased from Russia, while the TAF has 210 modern F-16s and Mirage 2000-5s.¹⁵⁷ The F-16 and the Mirage 2000-5 are superior to any of the PLAAF's aircraft to include the SU 27's.¹⁵⁸ Moreover, analysts believe the IDF to be superior to any PLAAF fighters built in China.¹⁵⁹ Besides gaining air superiority, the TAF can also assist the navy thwarting Mainland China's attempt at a naval blockade.

The Mainland is incapable of invading Taiwan with its army, therefore a naval blockade may appear to be a low risk way to collapse Taiwan's economy and compel them into reunification. However, a blockade would not be quick or effective because Taiwan possesses a modern and capable fleet and, in spite of China's attempts at naval modernization, it still does not possess the naval fleet necessary to sustain such a strategy and won't have one in the near to mid-term. Additionally, it cannot gain air superiority against Taiwan to protect the fleet and "if it used submarines, it would have to find a way to counter Taiwan's modern anti-submarine warfare capabilities"¹⁶⁰ It is clear that Taiwan maintains a ground, air and sea advantage, however, the one real threat may be from land-based missiles.

By 2005, Department of Defense analysts expect Mainland China to possess approximately 600 land-based missiles capable of striking Taiwan. The U.S. has sold Taiwan the Patriot anti-missile system to help counter the threat, but the quantity would prove inadequate against a large missile salvo. Taiwan desires to purchase four AEGIS equipped destroyer; however, that does not solve its problem in the near to mid-term. Even if the Bush Administration sold Taiwan the destroyers, they still require building and delivery would come probably after 2010.¹⁶¹ In summary, Taiwan's only requirement from the U.S. for defense is a missile defense system provided by the 7th Fleet.¹⁶²

NORTH KOREA-SOUTH KOREA

North Korea clearly has approximately a 2:1 advantage in the quantity of active military forces. However, what the ROK lacks in quantity, it compensates with a qualitatively superior armed force. The ROK has a qualitative advantage in equipment, logistics, maintenance and personnel.

For example, much of the KPA's equipment is obsolete and an incessant shortage of fuel and repair parts required a thirty percent reduction in training during 1998-1999. Conversely, the ROKA, although smaller, is modernizing its force to make it more lethal. The ROKA is replacing its older main battle tanks with the new KA1 equipped with a 120mm smooth bore gun system and is developing domestically the M109A2 self-propelled howitzer. In 1995, retired Major General Edward B. Atkinson wrote, although the ROKA is smaller, "the combined scores of infantry fighting vehicles and armored personnel vehicles closely match the North. The South

Korean Army may thus enjoy a measure of combat equivalency in tactical mobility, considering its size.”¹⁶³ Since that time the ROKA has continued to modernize, while KPA continued a decade long slide in military capabilities.¹⁶⁴

The ROKA also has the added advantage of restrictive terrain to deny an invasion. The KPA may not be able not be able to mass at a decisive point because of the limited avenues of approach and the mountainous terrain. The Congressional Budget Office concluded that the mountainous terrain “is such a dominant factor in assessing the Korean military balance that conventional measures of military strength do not fully apply.”¹⁶⁵

The monograph contends that the ROKA is more than capable of stopping an invasion from the North. If that is so, it begs the question as to the role of the U.S. 2d Infantry Division. Doug Bandow, *Tripwire: Korea and U.S. Foreign Policy in a Changed World*, argues that the 2d Infantry Division contributes little to the ROKA’s ability to stop an invasion. In fact, General John Bahnsen, Chief of Staff of the ROK/U.S. Combined Field Army in the early 1980s, stated, “The wisdom of maintaining any U.S. infantry division in a country so rich in manpower is purely political.”¹⁶⁶ It is quite apparent that the ROKA can contain a ground attack from the North, but how would the ROKAF respond against a numerically superior air force?

The North Korean Air Force has a large quantitative advantage in combat aircraft over the ROKAF, but falls considerably short when comparing the quality of the two forces. Many of the aircraft are obsolete, in fact; only ninety aircraft are post 1970 models, whereas the ROKAF has purchased 120 F-16Cs from the U.S. The ROKAF continues to improve its capabilities by purchasing weapons systems to enhance the effectiveness of its F-16s, and is seeking to acquire the F-15 Strike Eagle with state of the art weapons systems.¹⁶⁷

The North Korean Air Force is beset by additional problems: only forty percent of the aircraft can operate south of Seoul to support the army, and an estimated sixty percent of the aircraft lack modern radar and navigation systems making them vulnerable in poor weather. Finally, North Korean has suffered from a significant reduction in pilot training because of shortages of fuel and spare parts.¹⁶⁸

The ROKAF's modernization program also focuses on reducing its dependency on U.S. capabilities by producing indigenously built air platforms and by purchasing U.S. equipment. In 2000, the ROKAF purchased eight reconnaissance and surveillance aircraft from the U.S to begin assuming the U.S. mission of indication and warning of an invasion. The ROKAF is also focusing on post-unification threats, specifically, Japan. *Jane's Sentinel Security Assessment* argues that the acquisition of air power systems is not to defeat the DPRK's Air Force, but to match the capabilities of Japan's Air Force.¹⁶⁹

The monograph argues that there is not a need for the U.S. Air Force to assist in protecting the ROK for three reasons. First, the ROKAF has a qualitative advantage, and is expanding the advantage through foreign purchases and indigenously built weapons systems. Second, the ROKAF is modernizing not for North Korea, but for Japan. *Jane's Sentinel Security Assessment* calls the Japanese Air Force potent, well balanced and well funded.¹⁷⁰ If the ROKAF can match Japan's Air Force, it certainly can counter any North Korean air threat. Finally, the ROKAF is purchasing capabilities to reduce and eventually eliminate the need for U.S. personnel. Like the ROKAF, the ROKN lacks the quantitative edge, but maintains a qualitative advantage over its counterpart.

The North Korean Navy is the smallest element of the armed forces numbering approximately 45,000 sailors. Although the North Korean Navy has the quantitative advantage in overall naval vessels, much of its equipment is outdated. The ROKN has a superior surface fleet and in 1999 manifested its capabilities by defeating the North Korea Navy in a series of skirmishes in the Yellow Sea. The North Korean Navy comprises mostly small boats of two hundred tons or less. Of these, ninety-percent are coastal boats and small landing craft intended for infiltration operations and coastal defense, whereas the ROKN is building a naval fleet capable of reaching into the Indian Ocean to protect maritime interests.¹⁷¹ North Korea does possess some twenty outdated Romeo-class submarines able to block the sea lines of communication, but the ROKN has ordered an undisclosed number of submarines for delivery early this century to counter the threat.¹⁷²

In conclusion, based on the analysis, the ROK military is capable of defeating an invasion from the North without U.S. forces in Korea. The ROKA has qualitative advantage without the 2d Infantry Division. As General Bahnsen stated in the early 1980s, keeping the 2d Infantry Division in South Korea was a political versus practical military decision. The ROKAF and ROKN also have qualitative advantages over their counterparts and continue to modernize the forces.

Moreover, in their book, *North Korea Through the Looking Glass*, authors Kongdan Oh and Ralph C. Hassig, claim Russia or China would not assist North Korea to offset the quantitative advantages. Russia notified Pyongyang in 1995 that it would no longer recognize the Treaty on Friendship, Cooperation, and Mutual Assistance signed in 1961. The two countries signed a new treaty in February 2000; however, the provision promising Russian assistance in the case of an attack was deleted. The authors also argue that although China is still a loyal supporter of North Korea, it is unlikely to support the country in a conflict.¹⁷³

In the final analysis the monograph agrees with Doug Bandow, who asserts that the U.S. military presence in South Korea is not necessary, but it simply acts as a "Tripwire" by ensuring that there would be American casualties, therefore, making it highly unlikely that the U.S. would not send reinforcements to the peninsula.

MYANMAR-THAILAND

Myanmar owns a 2:1 advantage in the number of military forces; however, it appears that Thailand is quite capable of defending itself against the quantitatively superior force. Myanmar's army, although large, trains for counterinsurgency operations, while Thailand has transitioned to a conventional force that is capable of defending its border. *Jane's Sentinel Security Assessment* argues that although the Myanmar Army, numbering approximately 400,000, has crushed numerous smaller anti-government factions, it would have a difficult time defeating a well organized, well established guerilla group.¹⁷⁴ The RTA has 190,000 well- trained and efficient soldiers prepared for conventional operations with the capability to mobilize an additional 500,000 reserves. The RTA also receives training from U.S. military advisors in conventional and unconventional warfare, and engages in major training exercises with its Allies to include the U.S.

and Australia. The RTA would also receive support from an air force that, according to *Jane's Sentinel Security Assessment*, is quite capable.

Although, the monograph contends that both the RTAF and the Myanmar Air Force are in poor condition relative to other air forces in Asia, Thailand still maintains an advantage because of its thirty-six F-16s, which are superior to any aircraft in the Myanmar fleet. Additionally, Thailand's pilots receive training in the U.S., while the Myanmar Air Force lacks trained pilots. Although Thailand is capable of combating a Myanmar threat, it is doubtful that without U.S. funding it could maintain the advantage. In 2000, the U.S. provided a ninety million dollar package of ammunition for the Thai armed forces to conduct training and increased funding for International Military Education and Training (IMET) to assist the armed force during the economic crisis. The U.S. also has assisted Thailand by implementing economic sanctions on Myanmar.

The U.S has suspended economic aid to Myanmar and has withdrawn Myanmar's eligibility for trade and investment programs; implemented an arms embargo and has blocked assistance from international financial institutions.¹⁷⁵

In summary, Thailand is capable of successfully engaging Myanmar without assistance from U.S. forward deployed forces. The RTA and RTAF have a qualitative advantage and continued U.S. financial support and military training ensures that Thailand maintains the advantage.

PHILIPPINES-INTERNAL THREAT

The defense posture of the Philippine military is poor, but is capable of controlling the internal stability in the country. The armed forces maintain a 2.6:1 advantage size over the secessionist factions and the Communist insurgency.¹⁷⁶ However, the army, which has the primary responsibility to combat the internal threat has only a 1.5:1 advantage and can expect little support from the air force and navy.

The Philippine Army still maintains the tactical advantage for three reasons: the four different factions and the Communists have separate agendas and do not function as a well-coordinated force; the factions have limited their movements primarily to the southern islands of the archipelago, thus enabling the Philippine Army to concentrate its forces in a relatively small area;

and, the Philippines has renewed its agreement with the U.S. to conduct annual bilateral training exercises, which should contribute significantly to overall defense improvement.¹⁷⁷

In conclusion, based on the analysis, the monograph contends that the U.S. could reduce its forward presence. There is no requirement for forward deployed ground or air forces; however; there is a continuing requirement for the naval forces. The only identified weakness of an “Ally” is Taiwan’s lack of a missile defense system. If the present or future administrations choose not to support Taiwan, then even the naval forces become unnecessary for defending vital interests in the region.

The monograph has now determined the U.S. could reduce its force structure in Asia if the only intent is to protect Allies. The monograph next analyzes if U.S. requires forward deployed forces to maintain stability where America has a large economic stake.

CHAPTER FOUR

The 1999 U.S. National Security Strategy defines one of the national interests as stability in regions where the U.S. has a large economic stake. It further states that one of core objectives of national security is to promote prosperity both home and abroad. “Prosperity at home depends on stability in key regions with we trade or from which we import critical commodities such as oil or natural gas.”¹⁷⁸ This chapter analyzes whether forward deployed forces are necessary in Asia to promote prosperity at home. The first section examines U.S economic stakes in Asia to determine if it is a key-trading region for the U.S. Next, the chapter explores the potential affects on stability in the region if the U.S. were to withdraw its forward deployed forces. The chapter concludes by analyzing sections one and two to determine if it is in U.S. national economic interests to maintain forward deployed forces in Asia

U.S. ECONOMIC STAKES IN ASIA

Asia has had an unparalleled rise in economic prosperity. In 1960, Asia accounted for only four percent of the world’s gross domestic product, in 1995, Asia’s GDP accounted for 25.9 percent while the U.S. share of the world GDP amounted to 26.3 percent.¹⁷⁹ During this period, Japan developed into one of world’s largest economies and Asia surpassed Europe with respect to overall trade with the U.S. Currently, the U.S. conducts approximately thirty-six percent of its

total trade with Asia and analysts expect the percentage to increase steadily in the century's first decade.¹⁸⁰ The current export and import trade statistics provide an example of the vast U.S. economic stake in Asia.

In 1999, total U.S. total trade exports reached nearly seven hundred billion dollars. Of that, trade with Asia accounted for approximately 29.5 percent, while Europe accounted for approximately 24.5 percent. Only the Western Hemisphere, which includes South America, Canada and Mexico, surpassed Asia. Furthermore, in 1999, Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan ranked number three, six and seven respectively for U.S. exports to individual countries, while Japan maintained the largest market for U.S. agricultural goods.¹⁸¹

In 1999, the U.S. trade imports exceeded one trillion dollars. Asia accounted for approximately forty percent of all imports exceeding both the Western Hemisphere (36.6 %) and Western Europe (22%). Furthermore, Japan and China ranked number two and four respectively for U.S. imports from individual countries.¹⁸² The U.S. market is also critical to Asian prosperity. For example, over the period 1992 to 1999, China's reliance on the U.S. as an export market doubled. In 1996, the U.S. market supported more than ten million Chinese jobs and in 1999, the U.S. took approximately twenty per cent of China's total exports.¹⁸³

In summary, the U.S. export/import trade data visibly demonstrates that that the U.S. has a vast economic stake in Asia. The Asian region ranks number two as the recipient of U.S. exports and is the number one importing region to the U.S. Only the Western Hemisphere commands an overall superior trading status with the U.S., while Europe remains a distant third in economic significance to the U.S.¹⁸⁴ Most importantly, the future of economic interaction with Asia looks positive as service markets in Asia are expanding and regional economies are opening new opportunities for U.S. firms.¹⁸⁵ The next section explores the influence of U.S. forward deployed military forces in Asia on stability in the region.

ASIAN STABILITY AND U.S. FORWARD DEPLOYED FORCES

The U.S. troop reduction in Asia from 1989 to 1995, coupled with the American withdrawal from the Philippines, and the U.S. "hands-off" policy towards the Spratlys, produced a perception in Asia that the U.S. was disengaging from the region. The concern is intensifying as Asia views

U.S. foreign policy as Euro centric, despite the fact that U.S. trade with Asia is more significant than with Europe.¹⁸⁶

There are several reasons for the U.S focus on Europe. There are strong political and cultural ties to Europe, and many of the top U.S. foreign policy makers served in Europe in their formative years. This Euro centric focus has led American policy makers to place Asia in a lesser role and has led to an Asian perception that the U.S. is neglecting the region.¹⁸⁷ The perception of neglect makes U.S. Allies question America's ability and commitment to carry out its security agreements. A further reduction in U.S. forces from the region is likely to exacerbate reservations about U.S. security commitments and raise serious questions about a potential power vacuum created by a U.S. withdrawal. Asia overall is apprehensive that China or Japan may attempt to fill the void.¹⁸⁸

Although Asian countries fear a burgeoning China attempting to fill the vacuum, there is also the profound concern over the reemergence of a powerful Japan. Asia still remembers Japanese aggression during the Sino-Japanese War (1904-05), the establishment of a puppet state in Manchuria in 1931, the invasion of China in 1937, and its encroachment into Southeast Asia during World War II. While China publicly condemns the U.S. for stationing troops in Asia, it privately views a U.S. presence in Asia as a deterrent to Japanese rearmament.¹⁸⁹

There is profound concern in China that Japan would view a U.S. withdrawal from the region as a justification to further erode the provisions of Article IX of its Constitution. Article IX stipulates that, "Japan renounces war as a sovereign right of the nation; repudiates the use of force as means for setting international disputes; and does not recognize the belligerency of the state."¹⁹⁰ The fear cannot be substantiated without an actual American withdrawal from the region, however, China has a fundamental reason to fear a potentially bellicose Japan: the history of the relationship since Japan's declaration of war on China in 1894.

Japan attacked Chinese warships off the west coast of Korea and then deployed troops onto Korean to eject Chinese influence from the peninsula. The Japanese rapidly expanded its attacks into China and by March 1895, China had no alternative but to seek a truce.¹⁹¹ From 1895 through the 1930s, Japan's influence and territorial occupation grew. Japan exacerbated the already strained relationship by attacking China in 1937, and subsequently executed the 1937

“Rape of Nanking,” where Japanese troops entered the city of Nanking, and for seven weeks soldiers assaulted, robbed, and murdered an estimated 350,000 Chinese civilians and troops.¹⁹² Japan’s actions have created a high degree of distrust not only from China, but also from the rest of the Asian community. Asia views Japan as inherently hostile and has concerns that without a physical U.S. presence in Asia, there is a very real possibility of Japan expanding its military power.¹⁹³

For now, Japan’s domestic anti-militarist sentiment constrains the government from building a powerful military force. However, if U.S. forces withdraw and Japan determines that it faces an increasingly hostile environment, it may seek other diplomatic reassurances and a greater military self-reliance.¹⁹⁴ One Japanese response may be the development and deployment of nuclear weapons. An American withdrawal may be the impetus for Japan to overcome its reluctance to build and deploy its own nuclear forces as France did in 1961. Currently, Japan depends on the U.S. nuclear umbrella for its protection and the government adheres to a non-nuclear policy. The policy declares Japan will not produce, import, or allow countries to store nuclear weapons on its soil. A change in the U.S. security relationship, the elimination of the U.S. nuclear umbrella over Japan, or developments in either China or Korea, may well cause Japan to reevaluate its policy.¹⁹⁵

According to Nancy Bernkopf Tucker, a noted expert on Asian affairs, a nuclear force would lessen Japan’s subservience to U.S. decision-making and would give it a more reliable security assurance.¹⁹⁶ With a nuclear arsenal and a defense industry capable of quickly providing enough equipment for a much larger armed force, there is a strong perception throughout Asia that a powerful and potentially hostile Japan could emerge and precipitate instability in the region.¹⁹⁷

Major General Robert H. Scales, former Commandant, U.S. Army War College and Colonel Larry M. Wortzel, Director of Strategic Studies, U.S. Army War College, also argue that the withdrawing U.S. forces in the region would create instability. They assert that forward deployed U.S. forces assuage Asian concern for a hegemonic China or a rearmed Japan. “A U.S. withdraw...would lead to a serious arms race, competition for control of the Korean peninsula,

competition for control of the sea and air lines of communication...and would probably create a nuclear arms race.”¹⁹⁸

In summary, a U.S. withdraw of military forces from Asia would cause instability in the region. Asian nations fear a U.S. absence would create a power vacuum with China and Japan seeking to fill the void. Surprisingly, Asia's primary concern is not China, but the reemergence of militarily powerful Japan. Asian nations view the U.S. presences as one of balancing power in the region that deters hegemonic aspirations that could provoke instability in the region.¹⁹⁹

This chapter has determined that Asia is a vital economic region for the U.S., and an American withdrawal from the region would undoubtedly contribute to instability in the region. Next, the chapter analyzes the link between American prosperity, Asian instability, and U.S. forward deployed troops in the region.

ANALYSIS OF AMERICAN PROSPERITY AND FORWARD DEPLOYED FORCES

The U.S. 1999 National Security Strategy lists its second core objective as promoting prosperity at home and abroad. The Institute for National Strategic Studies, *1999 Strategic Assessment: Priorities for a Turbulent World*, argues that the U.S. has a vital interest in Asian region because U.S prosperity is linked to Asia.²⁰⁰ Analysis has shown that that U.S. trade with Asia is second to only the Western Hemisphere and Asia has the potential to be America's largest trading partner. Asia's prosperity and significance as an American trading partner has been the result of regional stability. Regional stability within Asia has allowed individual nations to develop their economies instead of seeking military superiority over others.²⁰¹

However, stability and economic growth has not come without cost. Thomas L. Friedman, who discusses the global economy in his recent and highly acclaimed book, *Lexus and the Olive Tree*, asserts that “markets function and flourish only when property rights are secure and can be enforced which in turn, requires a political framework protected and backed by a military power.”²⁰² He further argues that a U.S. presence is essential to markets because of American willingness to use power against those who would threaten to destabilize the system.²⁰³

Although Asian's no longer have to worry about a destabilizing threat from the former Soviet Union, there is a still pronounced opportunity for instability in the region. There is a fundamental

fear of a hegemonic China or a resurgent militarily powerful Japan. The problem for Asia is that its “nations lack both a recent memory of cooperation and tradition of thinking of themselves as members of a distinct entity.”²⁰⁴ “Even during the Cold War when American influence was at its apex in Asia, the U.S. was unable to coalesce its Asian Allies into a set of political and military institutions capable of containing such a diverse group.”²⁰⁵

U.S. military forces in the region help relieve uncertainties within a diverse group of nations. Former Secretary of State James Baker noted that, whereas security was the primary concern prior to the Soviet Union’s demise, the primary rationale for our defense engagement in the region is to provide geopolitical balance and guard against uncertainty among Asian nations.²⁰⁶ Uncertainties can create a feeling of increasing insecurity, which could exacerbate the need to field large standing armies. In the end, the anticipation of war becomes a self-fulfilling prophecy.

The monograph contends that the U.S. forward deployed military forces provide balance, eliminate uncertainties, and allow Asian nations to focus on their economies, and not on their militaries. Joseph Nye, a noted Harvard University government specialist, argues that among the most salient, but often forgotten reasons for Asian prosperity are American alliances and the presence of forward deployed U.S. forces.²⁰⁷

In conclusion, Asia’s unparalleled economic growth has had a significant influence on America’s prosperity. Asian nations have been able to develop their economies in an environment of relative stability because of a U.S. forward military presence. The U.S. military presence has provided Asian nations the confidence to invest in their economies versus their militaries, which has translated to American prosperity. However, that does not necessarily mean that ensuring stability requires all U.S. forces to remain in the region. The monograph’s final chapter provides recommendations on force structure in the region. This monograph has examined the need for U.S. forward deployed forces in Asia to protect physical property and to maintain stability in a region where the U.S. has large economic stakes. Next, the monograph summarizes the earlier analysis, answers the monograph question, and provides recommendations for a force structure in Asia.

CHAPTER FIVE

This chapter summarizes the analysis conducted in the preceding chapters to answer the monograph question: Is it U.S. national interests to maintain forward deployed military forces in Asia? The first section provides the monograph's conclusions. Next, the monograph provides recommendations on a viable force structure based on the analysis. The conclusions first summarize the analysis for the criterion: Does the U.S. require forward deployed forces in Asia to protect U.S. physical property and that of its Allies?

CONCLUSIONS

The analysis in chapter three showed that the U.S. Allies are quite capable of self-defense with reduced American presence in Asia. With respect to South Korea, its armed forces are capable of thwarting a North Korean attack. U.S. forces are simply there to act as a tripwire to ensure America ire and subsequent reinforcements to the peninsula. South Korea's armed forces continue to improve steadily, while the North Korean forces suffer from severe lack modern equipment, petroleum, and spare parts. Even if President Kim Jung Il continues to devote twenty-five to thirty percent of the country's GDP for military purposes, it is not enough to offset the qualitative differences. Instead of U.S. troops physically located in South Korea, one could argue that other U.S. forces could assist the South Korean effort by providing military strikes against strategic targets and critical air and naval forces to help shape the battlefield; a capability the ROKAF does not possess.

Using cruise missiles launched from B-52s and naval platforms, the U.S. could engage designated strategic targets. The 7th Fleet can provide the naval platform; however, there are no B-52s in Asia. The U.S. Air Force stations its B-52s at Barksdale Air Force Base, Louisiana, and Minot Air Force Base, North Dakota. The current plan is to use the 36th Air Base Wing at Andersen Air Force Base, Guam, as a forward operating base for B-52s arriving from the U.S. In September 1996, the wing provided around-the clock forward deployment support to Air Combat Command's B-52s during their OPERATION DESERT STRIKE missions over Iraq.²⁰⁸ The air force is now stockpiling cruise missiles for the B-52 bombers on Guam, marking the first time these missiles have been stored outside the continental United States.²⁰⁹ Like South Korea,

Taiwan is also capable of defending itself with a reduced American presence. The monograph has argued that Taiwan's only military weakness with respect to defending itself against a Mainland China attack is its missile defense. Admiral Dennis Blair, Commander and Chief, PACOM, supports this monograph's conclusion with respect to Taiwan, when he informed members of congress on 27 March 2001, that Mainland China is capable of causing damage to Taiwan using its land-based missiles, however, "it is not capable of taking and holding Taiwan."²¹⁰ As discussed earlier, Taiwan depends on the U.S. to provide a missile defense with the 7th Fleet's two Aleigh Burke-Class Destroyers. Even if President George W. Bush's Administration decides to sell Taiwan the destroyers, this does not solve Taiwan's problem in the near or mid-term, because it may take nearly ten years to build and deliver. Unlike South Korea and Taiwan, a third U.S. Ally, Thailand, will not require direct U.S. military intervention in a conflict against Myanmar.

Although outnumbered, Thailand is quite capable of defending itself without U.S. involvement. Thailand possesses a qualitatively superior force over Myanmar; however, the monograph contends that Thailand's military advantage depends on continuing U.S. economic and security assistance support. The RTA receives training from U.S. military advisors in conventional and unconventional warfare, and the RTAF pilots receive their training in the U.S. Moreover, Thai forces engage in major training exercises with its Allies to include the U.S. and Australia. The U.S. also supports Thailand with foreign military sales, and has recently provided Thailand with additional funding to compensate for Thailand's weak economy. Although the economy is likely to recover, Thailand still requires the training and equipment that that U.S. provides. The conclusions have so far identified that a reduced U.S. presence is possible because the scope of external threats is lower than in the past. The conclusion next analyzes the Philippines and its potentially destabilizing internal threat.

The monograph did not define an external threat for the Philippines. Although, the Philippines itself views China as a potential threat because of the disputed Spratly islands, the U.S. has explicitly stated that it expects the countries involved in the Spratly issue to resolve the situation peacefully. The primary Philippine threat is internal and comes from a Muslim secessionist movement functioning principally in the southern portion of the archipelago. There are also the

last vestiges of a Communist movement that joined the secessionists after the Philippine government agreed to recommence bilateral training exercises with the U.S. Although the Philippine military would prove weak against a formidable external threat, it does have both a quantitative and qualitative advantage over the Muslim secessionists and the Communists. Moreover, the military's posture is likely to improve now that the U.S. and the Philippines have resumed annual training exercises.

In summary, the monograph contends that U.S. military forces must remain in Asia to help protect its Allies, but can accomplish the mission with a reduced military presence. Next, the monograph discusses the second criterion: Does the U.S. require forward deployed military forces to maintain stability in a region where the U.S. has large economic stakes.

Asia has had unparalleled economic growth, and that growth has been a significant contributing factor to American prosperity. The Asian region is second only to the Western Hemisphere in overall trade with the U.S., and it has the potential to be its number one trading region. Asian economic growth has resulted from relative stability in the region and the presence of U.S. forward deployed forces has helped to ensure that stability.

U.S. military forces in the region mitigate Asian apprehension about a hegemonic China or a militarily powerful Japan. A U.S. military presence in the region assuages Asian uncertainties over China or Japan, and provides the countries the opportunities to concentrate on their economies instead of their militaries, benefiting not only Asia, but also the U.S. economy. It is clear for the purpose of U.S. economic prosperity, it is in U.S. national interests to maintain forward deployed troops in Asia.

The monograph has determined that it is in U.S. national interests to maintain some forward deployed forces in the Asian region, both to protect its Allies and to protect its economic interests by acting as a deterrent to instability. However, the monograph contends that accomplishing these two missions, plus any additional military requirements may not require the current level of 100,000 troops. The monograph next provides recommendations on a potential force structure in Asia.

RECOMMENDATIONS ON STRUCTURE OF U.S. FORWARD DEPLOYED FORCES IN ASIA

Any composite military force in Pacific Command (PACOM) must contain the U.S. 7th Fleet. The naval presence provides capabilities to help defend Allies and is the salient contributor to deterring instability. The naval presence ensures sea lines of communication (SLOC) remain open. Because Japan depends heavily on the SLOC for its economic survival, it would never allow any nation to interrupt freedom of navigation and deny the use of the sea. Therefore, Japan, as a precautionary measure, would undoubtedly expand its own naval patrol areas and strengthen its naval, air and ground forces, thus alarming the rest of Asia if the U.S reduced its naval presence.²¹¹

Because U.S. Allies have capable ground forces, the U.S. can maintain fewer ground forces to respond to possible contingency operations and for peacetime military engagement. To handle potential contingencies, Robert H. Scales Jr. and Larry M. Wortzel, argue that at a minimum, a U.S. Army combat brigade and part a marine expeditionary force must remain in the region to provide a force capable of traditional maneuver war and forced entry.²¹² One brigade from the 2d Infantry Division in South Korea and a brigade from the 3d MEF in Okinawa would satisfy the requirement. Potential contingency operations may be similar to East Timor or forces needed to conduct non-combatant evacuation operations (NEO), or humanitarian operations.

U.S. forces would also have to conduct peacetime military engagement. Examples of peacetime military engagement are annual exercises with Thailand and the Philippines. The remaining ground forces coupled with other PACOM army forces, could participate in peacetime military engagement as part PACOM's theater engagement plan (TEP)²¹³ Peacetime military engagement is important because it helps act as a deterrent by strengthening allied and friendly nations against internal and external threat.²¹⁴ The monograph has now identified necessary naval and ground forces. Next, it identifies air power requirements in the region.

The monograph has determined that U.S. Allies have air forces capable of contending with the defined threat. However, the monograph contends that the 5th Air Force Japan should remain in Asia to maintain stability and to respond to potential contingencies. The 5th Air Force would assuage Asian concerns over a potentially strong Japanese Air Force. There is already growing

apprehension about Japan. The South Korean Air Force is basing its procurement not on a North Korean threat, but also on a rivalry with Japan. The 5th Air Force can provide the assets necessary for wide range of contingencies. It has the needed air lift capability, and is able to dominate the air at potential points of conflicts.

A U.S. force reduction would obviously exacerbate Asian concerns about a complete withdrawal from the region. The U.S. could mitigate the apprehension by placing additional pre-positioned equipment in Asia. Currently, there is equipment for a heavy army brigade in South Korea, and a marine expeditionary brigade at Guam. Positioning additional equipment on Korea or Japan would help reduce Asian concern for U.S. disengagement from the region and the ability handle its security alliances.

With the aforementioned force structure, the U.S. could inactivate remaining forces in South Korea or withdraw them to the U.S. along with remaining elements of the 3d MEF. The monograph also recommends for two reasons that the U.S. station its remaining forces in the Philippines if possible. First, Japan may eventually request that the U.S. reduce its presence on the home islands and Okinawa, or completely withdraw. Although a 1996 public opinion poll found that seventy percent of the Japanese favor the U.S-Japan alliance, sixty-seven percent would like to see a reduction in U.S. forces.²¹⁵ The problem of U.S. forces on Japanese soil is especially acute on Okinawa. On 27 February 2001, Okinawa's Governor Keiichi Inamine "said during a state assembly session on Monday that he would ask the central government's help in transferring some U.S. military exercises from Okinawa to the U.S. territory of Guam."²¹⁶ This was the first time that the governor has made that request. Second, the Philippines centralized geographic location would place U.S. forces in the best possible position to respond to problems in Asia.

In conclusion, the U.S. must maintain a capable force structure in Asia primarily to ensure stability in the region and be able to respond to potential contingencies. The forces must be flexible and agile enough to respond to a variety of missions; however, the monograph asserts that it is possible to meet all potential missions with a force structure less than the current 100,000.

ENDNOTES

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- ¹ The U.S. still had more involvement in Asia than in Europe.
- ² Amos A. Jordan, William J. Taylor Jr., and Michael J. Mazarr, *American National Security*, 3d ed. (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1999), 362.
- ³ The U.S. still maintains troops in Japan and Korea.
- ⁴ Amos A. Jordan, William J. Taylor Jr., and Michael J. Mazarr, *American National Security*, 3d ed., 362. Revolutionary movements include Ho Chi Minh in Vietnam against the French; the Huk rebellion in the Philippines, and Communist inspired insurgencies in Indonesia, Burma, Thailand and Malaya. The U.S. still maintains approximately 37,500 troops in the Republic of Korea.
- ⁵ Higdah Chiu, "The Question of Taiwan in Sino-American Relations," in *China and the Taiwan Issue*, ed. Higdah Chiu (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1979) 178-186. Prior to 1979, the U.S. had recognized the Republic of China (Taiwan) as the legal government of China.
- ⁶ STRATFOR, *U.S. Influence Retreats from Southeast Asia*, available from, <http://www.stratfor.com/>. Internet; accessed 31 August 2000. President Clinton made the promise to reduce regional fears that U.S. would further withdraw from the region. In November 2000, STRATFOR began requiring a membership.
- ⁷ Ibid.
- ⁸ Ibid.
- ⁹ Richard Halloran, *U.S. Reconsiders Ground Forces in Korea, Japan*, available from, <http://www.nyu.edu/globalbeat/pubs/ib62.html>. Internet; accessed 15 March 2001.
- ¹⁰ President Clinton's Administration worked diligently to engage China using economic rewards as enticements. China received permanent trade status in 2000 and may become a member of the World Trade Organization. The fiscal year 2001 defense budget is about 2.4% of the gross domestic product; the lowest since the interwar years. The U.S. no longer faces a well-defined global opponent, therefore has shifted its attention to localized conflicts, terrorism and states of concern.
- ¹¹ White House, *A National Security Strategy for a New Century*, (December 1999), 34.
- ¹² In 1950, President Truman ordered the navy to patrol the Taiwan Straits to protect Taiwan from Mainland China aggression.
- ¹³ Paul R. Schatz, "The American Policy and Strategy in East Asia," in *The American Military and the Far East*, ed. Joe C. Dixon (Washington D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1980), 127.
- ¹⁴ The marines landed in China in 1866, 1894 and 1895; in Japan in 1867 and 1868; Formosa 1867; Korea 1871, 1888 and 1894.
- ¹⁵ Roger Dingman, "The American Policy and Strategy in East Asia," in *The American Military and the Far East*, ed. Joe C. Dixon (Washington D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1980), 21.
- ¹⁶ Claude A. Buss, *The United States and the Philippines: Background for Policy* (Washington D.C.: American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research, 1977), 1-5.
- ¹⁷ Ibid.
- ¹⁸ Ibid.
- ¹⁹ *Boxer Rebellion*, available from, <http://www.smplanet.com/imperialism/fists.html>. Internet; accessed 13 January 2001. The Boxers derived the name from foreigners because of the ritualistic martial arts they practiced.
- ²⁰ *Boxer Rebellion*, available from, <http://www.funkndwagnalls.com/encyclopedia/getpage.asp?book=FWENOnline&page=003002223.asp>. Internet; accessed 13 January 2001.
- ²¹ The Manchu Dynasty collapsed in 1911 and the U.S. took advantage of the 7 September 1901 Protocol to deploy and maintain forces in China.
- ²² Edwin H. Simmons, "Commentary: Marines in East Asia," in *The American Military and the Far East*, ed. Joe C. Dixon (Washington D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1980), 173.
- ²³ Roger Dingman, "The American Policy and Strategy in East Asia," in *The American Military and the Far East*, ed. Joe C. Dixon (Washington D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1980), 32.

²⁴ Edwin M. Martin, *The Allied Occupation of Japan* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1948), 14-15. The U.S. also determined it was necessary to leave military forces throughout Asia to help deter the Soviet Union from spreading its Communist influence and to help former Japanese and European colonies transition to sovereign states.

²⁵ Joseph G.D. Babb, "Task Force Smith Revisited," *Military Review* (January/February 2000): 6.

²⁶ William E. Berry, *Threat Perceptions in the Philippines, Malaysia and Singapore*, available from, <http://www.usafa.af.mil/inss/ocp16.htm>. Internet; accessed 12 August 2000.

²⁷ John King Fairbank, *The Great Chinese Revolution: 1800-1985* (New York: Harper and Row, 1987), 262. Chiang's and Mao's forces worked together during World War II to repel the Japanese, however, after Japan's capitulation in August 1945, each set out to become the preeminent power in China.

²⁸ Norman A. Graebner, "The United States and East Asia, 1945-1960: The Evolution of Commitment," in *The American Military and the Far East*, ed. Joe C. Dixon (Washington D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1980), 56. Mao took control of China in 1949, while Chiang established the National government on the island of Formosa (Taiwan).

²⁹ Don Oberdorfer, *The Two Koreas* (Reading: Addison Wesley, 1997), 6-7. During the Cairo Declaration of 1943, the U.S., China and Britain agreed that eventually Korea would be free and independent. At the Yalta Conference in 1945, President Franklin D. Roosevelt proposed a U.S.-Soviet-Chinese trusteeship over Korea. Besides these non-binding discussions, there was very little planning for Korea until 10 August 1945.

³⁰ T.R. Fehrenbach, *This Kind of War* (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1963), 49.

³¹ *Ibid.*, 50.

³² Clay Blair, *The Forgotten War* (New York: Doubleday, 1987), 43-45.

³³ Norman A. Graebner, "The United States and East Asia, 1945-1960: The Evolution of Commitment," in *The American Military and the Far East*, ed. Joe C. Dixon (Washington D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1980), 59. The U.N. minus the absent Soviet Union voted unanimously on 27 June 1950 to support the American effort. At the same time, Truman dispatched the 7th Fleet to the Formosa Straits to deter any Mainland China aggression against Taiwan, and ordered additional military assistance to the Philippine government.

³⁴ Clay Blair, *The Forgotten War* (New York: Doubleday, 1987), 975.

³⁵ Norman A. Graebner, "The United States and East Asia, 1945-1960: The Evolution of Commitment," in *The American Military and the Far East*, ed. Joe C. Dixon (Washington D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1980), 57.

³⁶ Loren Baritz, *Backfire: A History of How American Culture Led Us into Vietnam and Made Us Fight the Way We Did* (New York: William Morrow and Company, Inc, 1985), 73.

³⁷ H.R. McMaster, *Dereliction of Duty* (New York: HarperPerennial, 1997), 37. The 1954 Geneva Accord authorized a maximum of 1000 military advisors. Kennedy believed that the increased Viet Cong activity in South Vietnam and Laos justified transgressing the Accord. Although U.S. advisors were fighting with South Vietnam units, Kennedy denied American combat involvement to the public and congress.

³⁸ The period 1964-1969 was arguably one of the most divisive periods in American history. President Johnson and the Joint Chiefs of Staff could never agree on how to prosecute the war. As early as 1964, President Johnson believed that the war in Vietnam would be a costly failure. President Johnson's first priority was his Great Society program and wanted to pursue a strategy in Vietnam that appeared cheap and received minimal congressional and public opinion. His strategy proved to be a complete failure, as the American public grew increasingly weary of the conflict. In 1968, President Johnson stated he would not run for reelection.

³⁹ Loren Baritz, *Backfire: A History of How American Culture Led Us into Vietnam and Made Us Fight the Way We Did* (New York: William Morrow and Company, Inc, 1985), 204. President Nixon made the decision unilaterally and did not demand that North Vietnam first withdraw its troops. President Nixon's plan was to use South Vietnam as a proxy like the Soviets and Chinese used North Vietnam. President Nixon would support South Vietnam with economic and military assistance, but would leave the fighting to them. President Nixon also made the decision to further withdraw troops from South Korea. In 1971, he ordered the 7th Infantry Division from

Korea, leaving a military force of approximately 40,000 to help defend South Korea. President Nixon's Secretary of Defense Melvin Laird signed off on a plan to reduce the remaining combat unit, the 2d Infantry Division to a single brigade, however, Dr. Kissinger and Alexander Haig, deputy assistant to the president for foreign affairs, blocked the implementation.

⁴⁰ Ibid., 224-231. Dr. Kissinger received the Nobel Peace Prize for his contribution to the Paris peace agreement. Even with U.S. assistance, Saigon, South Vietnam's capital, fell to the North Vietnamese in April 1975. Over 2.5 million military personnel served in Vietnam and over 58,000 lost their lives.

⁴¹ Don Oberdorfer, *The Two Koreas: A Contemporary History* (Reading: Addison-Wesley, 1997), 84.

⁴² Ibid., 84-108. From 1975-1977, civilian analysts determined that North Korea's ground forces were forty percent larger than expected and had many more tanks and artillery pieces than previously known, giving the North a numerical advantage in ground forces and a 2:1 advantage over the South in terms of the numbers of those weapons systems.

⁴³ Report to Congress 1992, *A Strategic Framework for the Asian Pacific Rim*, 23. Clark Air Force Base would have probably been lost anyway. Mount Pinatubo erupted and destroyed the base before the senate's decision.

⁴⁴ *Defense of Japan 1999*, (Urban Connections, 1999), 44.

⁴⁵ *United States Pacific Command Facts*, available from, <http://www.pacom.mil/about/pacom.htm>. Internet; accessed 24 January 2001.

⁴⁶ The International Institute for Strategic Studies, *The Military Balance 1999-2000* (United Kingdom: Oxford University Press, 1999), 28

⁴⁷ Report to Congress 1992, *A Strategic Framework for the Asian Pacific Rim*, 13.

⁴⁸ Dennis Van Franken Hickey, *Taiwan's Security in the Changing International System* (Boulder, Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1997), 39-40.

⁴⁹ The author uses Southeast Asia for the territories because that is the area of focus for military forces stationed in Asia.

⁵⁰ Office of International Affairs, *Guam*, available from, <http://www.doi.gov/oia/chapter4.html>. Internet; accessed 6 February 2001.

⁵¹ *Navy Guam*, available from, <http://www.guam.navy.mil/>. Internet; accessed 5 February 2001.

⁵² Robert E. Osgood, *Alliances and American Foreign Policy* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1968), 4.

⁵³ Ibid., 75.

⁵⁴ Hungdai Chiu, "The Question of Taiwan in Sino-American Relations," in *China and the Taiwan Issue* (New York: Praeger, 1979), 160.

⁵⁵ *Fact Sheet: U.S., Asia-Pacific Security Alliances*, available from, <http://www.usis-israel.org.il/publish/journals/foreign/january98/prl8fact.htm>. Internet; accessed 12 August 2000.

⁵⁶ William E. Berry, *Threat Perceptions in the Philippines, Malaysia and Singapore*, available from, <http://www.usafa.af.mil/inss/ocp16.htm>. Internet; accessed 12 August 2000. One of the more contentious issues between the Philippines and the U.S. is the Spratly islands. The Philippines and five other nations claim rights to some of the islands, while China claims rights to all of the islands. Possession of the islands would also give the countries control of the surrounding waters, which are believed to have large deposits of oil. In the past few years, the Philippines and China have had minor skirmishes concerning the islands, but the U.S. refuses to acknowledge that the islands are included in the security agreement, and has stated that the Spratly issue should be resolved among the nations involved peacefully.

⁵⁷ Ibid.

⁵⁸ International Institute for Strategic Studies, *The Military Balance: 1999-2000* (London: Oxford Press, 1999), 172-173.

⁵⁹ Joseph Camilleri, *The Australian-New Zealand-U.S. Alliance: Regional Security in the Nuclear Age* (Boulder: Westview Press, 1987), 7.

⁶⁰ W. David McIntyre, *Background to the ANZUS Pact: Policy-Making, Strategy and Diplomacy, 1954-55* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1995), 405.

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- ⁶¹ ANZUS Still Key Part of Strategy, available from, <http://www.mercury.illnews.com.au/wed/2061330.htm>. Internet; accessed 12 August 2000. Australia's Prime Minister John Howard made the statement about the ANZUS pact.
- ⁶² Michel J. Green, "Interests, Asymmetries, and Strategic Choices," in *The U.S.-Japan Alliance in the 21st Century* (Council on Foreign Relations, 1998), 8.
- ⁶³ *Northeast Asia Peace and Security Network Daily Report*, available from, <http://www.nautilus.org>. Internet accessed; 4 February 2001.
- ⁶⁴ Ministry of National Defense, *1999 Defense of Japan* (Urban Connections), 44-45.
- ⁶⁵ William E. Berry Jr. *The Invitation to Struggle: Executive Legislative Competition over the U.S. Military Presence on the Korean Peninsula* (Carlisle: Strategic Studies Institute, 17 May 1997), 2. North Korea is one of the last Communist countries remaining after the dissolution of the Soviet Union in 1991. As a result, the country has suffered political isolation, much of it self-imposed, and has until recently refused to discuss peace with rival South Korea. However, on 31 October 2000, North Korea took a step towards peace by joining South Korea as co-sponsors in their first ever joint resolution to encourage peace efforts on the Korean Peninsula.
- ⁶⁶ Hungdai Chiu, "The Question of Taiwan in Sino-American Relations," in *China and the Taiwan Issue* (New York: Praeger, 1979), 184.
- ⁶⁷ *Ibid.*, 160.
- ⁶⁸ Martin L. Lassiter, *The Taiwan Issue in Sino-American Strategic Relations* (Boulder: Westview Press, 1984), 160.
- ⁶⁹ Lester L. Wolff and David L. Simon, *Legislative History of the Taiwan Relations Act* (New York: American Association for Chinese Studies, 1982), 288-289.
- ⁷⁰ *Southeast Asia Treaty Organization*, available from, <http://www.geocities.com/CapitolHill/6163/seato.html>. Internet; accessed 12 August 2000.
- ⁷¹ *Southeast Asia Treaty Organization*, available from, <http://www.bartleby.com/65/st/SthEATO.html>. Internet; accessed 12 August 2000.
- ⁷² Fact Sheet: U.S., Asia-Pacific Security Alliances, available from, <http://www.usis-israel.org.il/publish/journals/foreign/january98/prl8fact.htm>. Internet; accessed 12 August 2000.
- ⁷³ The U.S. was also concerned with the Vietminh and the Huk insurgency in the Philippines.
- ⁷⁴ U.S. Department of State, *Background Notes: Russia, June 1997*, available from, http://www.state.gov/www/background_notes/russia_0697_bgn.html. Internet; accessed 17 February 2001.
- ⁷⁵ *Ibid.*
- ⁷⁶ Jane's Sentinel Security Assessment, *Russia and the CIS: January-June 2001* (United Kingdom, 2000), 418.
- ⁷⁷ *Ibid.*
- ⁷⁸ *Kuril Islands*, available from, <http://encarta.msn.com/find/Concise.asp?ti=03B62000>. Internet; accessed 15 February 2001.
- ⁷⁹ Kongdan Oh and Ralph C. Hassig, *North Korea Through the Looking Glass* (Washington D.C.: Brookings Institute, 2000), 117.
- ⁸⁰ Jane's Sentinel Security Assessment, *Russia and the CIS: January-June 2001* (United Kingdom, 2000), 418.
- ⁸¹ *PRC Defense White Paper*, available from, <http://www.nautilus.org/napsnet/dr/index.html>. Internet; accessed 21 October 2000. The PRC released the White Paper in October 2000.
- ⁸² Ministry of National Defense, *2000 National Defense Report Republic of China*, 70.
- ⁸³ China initiated a doctrine change in 1993 after seeing the coalition forces evict Iraq from Kuwait. China's objective is to develop a military that can deter the U.S. from assisting Taiwan, to be able to successfully attack Taiwan, or to make Taiwan believe that trying to defend against a Chinese attack would be fruitless, and therefore capitulate without a fight.
- ⁸⁴ Federation of American Scientists, *Introduction to the PLA*, available from, <http://www.fas.org/nuk/guide/china/agency/pla-intro.htm>. Internet; accessed 15 September 2000.
- ⁸⁵ James H. Holt, *The China-Taiwan Military Balance*, available from, <http://www.comw.org/cmp/special/taiwan.html>. Internet; accessed 22 September 2000.

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- ⁸⁶ Frank W. Moore, *China's Military Capabilities*. Available from, <http://www.comw.org/cmp/>. Internet; accessed 3 October 2000.
- ⁸⁷ Jane's Sentinel Security Assessment, *China and Northeast Asia: December 1999-May 2000* (United Kingdom, 1999), 99.
- ⁸⁸ Andrew J. Nathan and Robert S. Ross, *The Great Wall and the Empty Fortress* (New York: W. W. Norton & Company, 1997), 150.
- ⁸⁹ Frank W. Moore, *China's Military Capabilities*, available from, <http://www.comw.org/cmp/>. Internet; accessed 10 March 2001.
- ⁹⁰ Ibid.
- ⁹¹ June Teufel Dreyer, *The PLA and the Taiwan Strait*, available from, <http://taiwansecurity.org/IS/FPRI-063000.htm>. Internet; accessed 22 September 2000.
- ⁹² David Shambaugh, *A Matter of Time: Taiwan's Eroding Military Advantage*, available from, <http://www.comw.org/cmp/special/taiwan.html>. Internet; accessed 25 September 2000.
- ⁹³ Ministry of National Defense, *2000 National Defense Report Republic of China*, 70.
- ⁹⁴ Henry J. Kenny, "South China Sea: A Dangerous Ground" *Naval War College Review*, (Summer 1996): 99.
- ⁹⁵ Bob Catley and Keliat Makmur, *Spratlys: The Dispute in the South China Sea* (Vermont: Ashgate Publishing Company, 1997), 46.
- ⁹⁶ Dennis Roy, "Hegemon on the Horizon," in *East Asian Security*, ed. Michael E. Brown, Sean M. Lyons, and Steven E. Miller (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1996), 127-128.
- ⁹⁷ Bob Catley and Keliat Makmur, *Spratlys: The Dispute in the South China Sea* (Vermont: Ashgate Publishing Company, 1997), 58.
- ⁹⁸ *The Basic View on the Sovereignty over the Senkaku Islands*, available from, <http://www.mofa.go.jp/region/asia-paci/senkaku/senkaku.html>. Internet; accessed 15 February 2001.
- ⁹⁹ Graham Hutchings, *Japan Foils Repeat of Chinese 'Invasion' of Disputed Islands*, available from, <http://www.freerepublic.com/forum/a1002240.htm>. Internet; accessed 25 February 2001.
- ¹⁰⁰ Bernard D. Cole, *The People's Liberation Army-Navy: Ten Issues*, available from, http://www.ndu.edu/inss/China_Center/paper17.htm. Internet; accessed 21 February 2001.
- ¹⁰¹ Jason D. Ellis and Todd M. Koca, *China Rising: New Challenge to the U.S. Security Posture*, available from, <http://www.ndu.edu/inss/strforum/sf175.html>. Internet; accessed 15 February 2001.
- ¹⁰² To reiterate, Taiwan is not a formal U.S. Ally.
- ¹⁰³ World Almanac Books, *World Almanac and Book of Facts 2000*, 207.
- ¹⁰⁴ The author studied June Teufel Dreyer, Martine Lassiter, David Shambaugh, Frank Morore, Michael Pillsbury and James Holt. All are subject matter experts on the issue of Taiwan and China, and agree that China's military strength is growing, but is not sufficient to invade Taiwan.
- ¹⁰⁵ Edward B. Atkinson, *The North Korean Military Threat in Perspective* (Arlington: The Institute of Land Warfare, 1995), 1.
- ¹⁰⁶ Kongdan Oh and Ralph C. Hassig, *North Korea Through the Looking Glass* (Washington D.C.: Brookings Institute, 2000), 110.
- ¹⁰⁷ Ministry of National Defense, *Republic of Korea Defense White Paper 1999*, 47.
- ¹⁰⁸ Jane's Sentinel Security Assessment, *China and Northeast Asia: January-May 2001* (United Kingdom, 2000), 412.
- ¹⁰⁹ World Almanac Books, *World Almanac and Book of Facts 2000*, 207.
- ¹¹⁰ Jane's Sentinel Security Assessment, *China and Northeast Asia: January-May 2001* (United Kingdom, 2000), 412. Jane's uses PKA; I have also seen North Korea People's Army (NPKA)
- ¹¹¹ Edward B. Atkinson, *The North Korean Military Threat in Perspective* (Arlington: The Institute of Land Warfare, 1995),
- ¹¹² Jane's Sentinel Security Assessment, *China and Northeast Asia: January-May 2001* (United Kingdom, 2000), 417.

- ¹¹³ Ibid., 424. Sixty percent of North Korea's aircraft are operationally limited to the thirty-seventh parallel, which is near Seoul.
- ¹¹⁴ Ibid., 424. Seventy percent of the aircraft were built prior to 1970.
- ¹¹⁵ Ministry of National Defense, *Republic of Korea Defense White Paper 1999*, 51-52.
- ¹¹⁶ Elizabeth Knowles, ed., *The Oxford Dictionary of Quotations*, 5th ed. (Oxford University Press, 2000), 215.
- ¹¹⁷ *Conditions in Burma and U.S. Policy Toward Burma*, available from, http://www.state.gov/www/regions/eap/000425_us-burma_report.html. Internet; accessed 21 February 2001. The U.S. State Department recognizes the country's name as Burma; however, academicians and newspapers use the name Myanmar. The monograph uses its official name, Myanmar
- ¹¹⁸ STRATFOR, *Political Infighting Weakens Myanmar*, available from, <http://www.stratfor.com/SERVICES/giu2001/021901.asp>. Internet; accessed 27 February 2001.
- ¹¹⁹ Ibid.
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- ¹²¹ Ibid.
- ¹²² *Kidnapping Crisis: Group Behind Abductions in the Philippines*, available from, http://www.janes.com/regional_security/news/sentinel/sent010112_1_n.shtml. Internet; accessed 27 February 2001.
- ¹²³ Ibid.
- ¹²⁴ Richard Halloran, *The Philippines: Another Indonesia*, available from, <http://www.nyu.edu/globalbeat/pubs/ib63.html>. Internet; accessed 26 February 2001.
- ¹²⁵ Dennis Van Vranken Hickey, *Taiwan's Security in the Changing International System* (Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1997), 50.
- ¹²⁶ Arthur Shu-fan Ding and Alexander Chie-cheng, "Taiwan's military in the 21st Century: Redefinition and Reorganization," in *The Chinese Armed Forces in the 21st Century*, ed. Larry M Wortzel (Carlisle: Strategic Studies Institute, 1998), 254.
- ¹²⁷ Jane's Sentinel Security Assessment, *China and Northeast Asia: December 1999-May 2000*, 517.
- ¹²⁸ Ibid.
- ¹²⁹ John F. Cooper, "Taiwan's Military Modernization: A Unique Case in Problems and Adjustments," *National Security Studies Quarterly* 7, no. 1 (2001): 99-110.
- ¹³⁰ David Shambaugh, *A Matter of Time: Taiwan's Eroding Military Advantage*, available from, <http://www.comw.org/cmp/special/taiwan.html>. Internet; accessed 25 September 2000.
- ¹³¹ June Teufel Dreyer, "Taiwan's Military: A View from Afar," in *The Chinese Armed Force in the 21st Century*, ed. Larry M. Wortzel (Carlisle: Strategic Studies Institute, 1999), 300-308. Mainland China also places political pressure on foreign countries to prevent them from selling submarines to Taiwan.
- ¹³² Ibid., 300-311.
- ¹³³ Ibid., 310-311.
- ¹³⁴ John F. Cooper, "Taiwan's Military Modernization: A Unique Case in Problems and Adjustments," *National Security Studies Quarterly* 7, no. 1 (2001): 97-116.
- ¹³⁵ Asian Defense Yearbook 1999-2000, "South Korea," *Asian Defense Journal* (2000): 143.
- ¹³⁶ Ibid.
- ¹³⁷ Jane's Sentinel Security Assessment, *China and Northeast Asia: December 1999-May 2000* (United Kingdom, 1999), 484.
- ¹³⁸ Christopher F. Foss, ed., *Jane's Armour and Artillery 20th ed.* (United Kingdom, 2000), 63.
- ¹³⁹ Northeast Asia Peace and Security Network Daily Report, *ROK-US Military Trade*, available from, <http://www.nautilus.org/napsnet/dr/index.html>. Internet; accessed 1 March 2001. In fact, the ROK is currently negotiating with Russia to purchase US\$500 million worth of Russian weapons as part of its efforts to retrieve some of its outstanding US\$1.8 billion loan to Russia.

¹⁴⁰ Jane's Sentinel Security Assessment, *China and Northeast Asia: January-May 2001* (United Kingdom, 2000), 492. It appears that the ROK considers the reunification a *fait accompli* and expects Japan to be its next external threat.

¹⁴¹ Ibid., 484-510.

¹⁴² Ibid., 498-515.

¹⁴³ Jane's Sentinel Security Assessment, *Southeast Asia* (United Kingdom, 1999).

¹⁴⁴ Ibid.

¹⁴⁵ Ibid.

¹⁴⁶ Jane's Sentinel Security Assessment, *Southeast Asia* (United Kingdom, 1999).

¹⁴⁷ Asian Defense Yearbook: 1999-2000, "Thailand," *Asian Defense Journal* (2000): 164.

¹⁴⁸ Ibid.

¹⁴⁹ Ibid., 161.

¹⁵⁰ Ibid., 162.

¹⁵¹ Jane's Sentinel Security Assessment, *Southeast Asia* (United Kingdom, 1999).

¹⁵² Ibid.

¹⁵³ Ibid.

¹⁵⁴ Jane's Sentinel Security Assessment, *China and Northeast Asia: December 1999-May 2000* (United Kingdom, 1999), 517.

¹⁵⁵ Gary Klingworth, *China and Taiwan-From Flashpoint to Redefining One China*, available from, <http://www.aph.gov.au/library/pubs/rp/2000-01/01rp15.htm>. Internet; accessed 10 March 2001.

¹⁵⁶ Frank W. Moore, *China's Military Capabilities*, available from, <http://www.comw.org/cmp/>. Internet; accessed 10 March 2001.

¹⁵⁷ Ibid.

¹⁵⁸ Ibid.

¹⁵⁹ David Shambaugh, *A Matter of Time: Taiwan's Eroding Military Advantage*, available from, <http://www.comw.org/cmp/special/taiwan.html>. Internet; accessed 25 September 2000.

¹⁶⁰ Ibid.

¹⁶¹ Bill Nichols, "Taiwan Options Color U.S.-China Talks," *USA Today*, 22 March 2001.

¹⁶² Ibid.

¹⁶³ Edward B. Atkinson, *The North Korean Military Threat in Perspective*, (Arlington: The Institute of Land Warfare, 1995), 7.

¹⁶⁴ George Tenet, Director of the CIA discussed the decade long slide in a statement to congress.

¹⁶⁵ Doug Bandow, *Tripwire: Korea and U.S. Foreign Policy in a Changed World* (Washington D.C.: Cato Institute, 1996), 69.

¹⁶⁶ Ibid., 36.

¹⁶⁷ Northeast Asia Peace and Security Network Daily, *ROK-U.S. Military Trade*, available from, <http://www.nautilus.org/napsnet/dr/index.html>. Internet; accessed 15 February 2001. The Korea Herald reported that an ROK Defense Ministry official stated that the U.S. has notified it that if the ROK buys Boeing's F-15 fighter jets for its next-generation fighter project, the U.S. would sell US\$1.5 billion worth of guided missiles and avionics systems.

¹⁶⁸ Jane's Sentinel Security Assessment, *China and Northeast Asia: December 1999-May 2000* (United Kingdom, 1999), 424.

¹⁶⁹ Ibid., 492.

¹⁷⁰ Ibid., 244.

¹⁷¹ Ibid., 428.

¹⁷² Ibid., 428.

¹⁷³ Kongdan Oh and Ralph C. Hassig, *North Korea Through the Looking Glass* (Washington D.C.: Brookings Institute, 2000), 107.

¹⁷⁴ Jane's Sentinel Security Assessment, *Southeast Asia* (United Kingdom, 1999).

¹⁷⁵ *Conditions in Burma and U.S. Policy Toward Burma*, available from, http://www.state.gov/www/regions/eap/000425_us-burma_report.html. Internet; accessed 21 February 2001.

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- ¹⁷⁶ The Philippine military numbers 116,000. The combined forces of the four secessionist factions and the Communists number 40,000
- ¹⁷⁷ As stated earlier, the Philippines recommenced bilateral training exercises with the U.S. The two countries conducted exercise BALIKATAN from January to March 2000, involving over 4,500 troops.
- ¹⁷⁸ White House, *A National Security Strategy for the New Century*, December 1999, 21.
- ¹⁷⁹ Muthia Alagappa, ed., *Asian Security Practices: Material and Ideational Influences*, (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1998), 7.
- ¹⁸⁰ *Ibid.*, 155.
- ¹⁸¹ U.S. Trade Data, available from, <http://www.ita.doc.gov/td/industry/otea/usfth/tabcon.html>. Internet; accessed 30 November 2000.
- ¹⁸² U.S. Department of State, *U.S. Economic Relations with East Asia and the Pacific*, available from, http://www.state.gov/www/regions/eap/fs-us-eap_econ_rels_981026.html. Internet; accessed 26 October 2000.
- ¹⁸³ U.S. Trade Data, available from, <http://www.ita.doc.gov/td/industry/otea/usfth/tabcon.html>. Internet; accessed 30 November 2000.
- ¹⁸⁴ The Western Hemisphere's overall trading percentage with the U.S. is 39.5 percent. Europe, which includes Western and Eastern Europe, is 23 percent.
- ¹⁸⁵ Stuart Harris, "The Impact of Economics in the New Asia-Pacific Region," in *The New Security Agenda in the Asia-Pacific Region*, ed. Dennis Roy (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1997), 55.
- ¹⁸⁶ Perry L. Wood, "The United States and Southeast Asia: Towards a New Era," in *Asian Security to the Year 2000*, ed. Diane L. Smith (Carlisle: Strategic Studies Institute, 1996), 121.
- ¹⁸⁷ *Ibid.*
- ¹⁸⁸ Robert H. Scales Jr. and Larry M. Wortzel, *The Future U.S. Military Presence in Asia: Landpower and Geostrategy of American Commitment* (Carlisle: Strategic Studies Institute, 1999), 4.
- ¹⁸⁹ *Ibid.*
- ¹⁹⁰ Peter J. Katzenstein and Nobou Okawara, "Japan's National Security: Structures, Norms and Policies," in *East Asian Security*, ed. Michael E. Brown, Sean M. Lyon-Jones and Steven Miller (Cambridge: The MIT Press, 1996), 284.
- ¹⁹¹ Marius B. Jansen, ed., *The Cambridge History of Japan*, vol. 5, *The Nineteenth Century* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989), 764-765.
- ¹⁹² Mark Ramirez, "Chiang's Bestseller Humanizes History," *Seattle Times*, available from, http://seattletimes.nwsource.com/news/lifestyles/html98/iris_020498.html. Internet; accessed 28 March 2001
- ¹⁹³ Aaron L. Friedberg, "Ripe for Rivalry: Prospects for Peace in Multipolar Asia," in *East Asian Security*, ed. Michael E. Brown, Sean M. Lyon-Jones and Steven Miller (Cambridge: The MIT Press, 1996), 27.
- ¹⁹⁴ Dennis Roy, "Hegemon on the Horizon," in *East Asian Security*, ed. Michael E. Brown, Sean M. Lyon-Jones and Steven Miller (Cambridge: The MIT Press, 1996), 128.
- ¹⁹⁵ William E. Berry, *Threat Perceptions in the Philippines, Malaysia and Singapore*, available from, <http://www.usafa.af.mil/inss/ocp16.htm>. Internet; accessed 12 August 2000
- ¹⁹⁶ Nancy Bernkopf Tucker, "The Taiwan Question and U.S. Relations with China," in *Blue Horizon: United States-Japan Tripartite Relations*, ed. Susan C Mayabaumwisniewski and Mary A. Sommerville (Washington D.C.: National Defense University Press, 1997), 112-113.
- ¹⁹⁷ Tim Huxley and Susan Willet, *Arming East Asia: Adelphi Paper 329* (New York: Oxford International Press, 1999), 47.
- ¹⁹⁸ Robert H. Scales Jr. and Larry M. Wortzel, *The Future U.S. Military Presence in Asia: Landpower and Geostrategy of American Commitment* (Carlisle: Strategic Studies Institute, 1999), 2.
- ¹⁹⁹ Paul Dibb, "The Emerging Strategic Architecture in the Asia-Pacific Region," in *The New Security Agenda in the Asia-Pacific Region*, ed., Dennis Roy (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1997), 112.

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- ²⁰¹ Ibid.
- ²⁰² Thomas L. Friedman, *The Lexus and the Olive Tree*, (New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, LLC, 1999; Anchor Books, 2000), 464.
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- ²⁰⁶ Amos A. Jordan, William J. Taylor, and Michael J. Mazarr, *American National Security: 5th ed.* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1999), 361.
- ²⁰⁷ Joseph S. Nye, "The Case for Deep Engagement." *Foreign Affairs* (July/August 1995): 90.
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